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Rethinking Injury: 
The Case of Informed Consent 
Erin Sheley* 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article argues that the traditional debates between the 
expressive and compensatory views of tort law ignore the way in which 
an injury may itself have an expressive component, one that in turn 
increases the extent of physical harm suffered by a victim. I take up the 
example of informed consent in the medical malpractice context to show 
how an excessively narrow idea of physical harm has negative 
consequences for tort law in general. In these situations, when a 
physician performs a procedure without providing the patient with 
sufficient information, we can better understand the harm that occurs 
through a combination of civil recourse theory and new insights from 
the field of narrative medicine. Under the current regime, the effort to 
cabin potential liability for physicians’ well-intended conduct has 
resulted in a disconnect between a negligence standard—with its 
requirement of strictly physical injury—and the actual harm in 
question, which has historically been recognized as at least partially 
dignitary. I argue that this disconnect can be resolved through a 
broader view of the nature of the injury suffered when a physician 
performs an inadequately authorized procedure. A more appropriate 
view would take into account the newly understood, long-term physical 
harms that arise when a physician co-opts a patient’s subjective 
knowledge about and narrative control over his body. I then argue that 
by focusing on remedies that consider the relational quality of the injury 
imposed on patients in these cases, tort scholars can be more responsive to 
 
*Assistant Professor, University of Calgary Faculty of Law. Many thanks to Marshall Alcorn, 
Andrew Bradt, Patrick Barry, Samuel Bray, Jay Butler, Donald Braman, David Fontana, 
Kristelia Garcia, Jody Madeira, Herschel Nachlis, Naomi Schoenbaum, Peter Smith, and 
Robert Tuttle, as well as the participants in the Young Legal Scholars Conference, the 
Georgetown-George Washington Junior Faculty Workshop, and the George Washington 
University Faculty Workshop for their invaluable comments on earlier drafts of this Article. 
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actual harms, not only in the case of informed consent but also 
throughout the tort regime generally. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is a longstanding question whether tort law is better 
understood as a system for allocating losses through compensation 
or as a process through which parties obtain formal recourse for 
wrongs done to them.1 The practical divergence between these two 
positions becomes particularly clear in the realm of “dignitary” torts 
such as battery. Compensation theory, the dominant view, has 
difficulty accounting for how the law permits claims in circumstances 
where no quantifiable physical injury has occurred. Some scholars 
have therefore suggested that such actions serve a theoretically 
distinct punitive or expressive purpose.2 Civil recourse theorists, on 
the other hand, argue that if we understand the unwanted touching 
itself as a form of wrong, then such a “harmless” battery is a 
completed, legally cognizable injury, theoretically no different from 
other types of torts.3 In this article I will take up the specific example 
of informed consent to show how the divisions created by this 
 
 1. For examples of the compensation model see, e.g., JOHN G. FLEMING, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TORTS 1 (1967) (describing the principal function of tort 
law as adjusting compensation for the costs of “industrial operations, methods of transport, 
and many another activity benignly associated with the ‘modern way of life’”); P.S. ATIYAH, 
ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 239 (3d ed. 1980) (describing tort law as the 
rules governing compensation for “road accidents”); GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF 
ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 312 (1970). For articulations of the wrongs-
based conception see, e.g., ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 134–35 (1995); 
John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 918–20 
(2010); and Steven D. Smith, The Critics and the ‘Crisis’: a Reassessment of Current 
Conceptions of Tort Law, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 778 (1987). 
 2. See, e.g., Bruce Chapman & Michael Trebilcock, Punitive Damages: Divergence in 
Search of a Rationale 40 ALA. L. REV. 741, 768–69 (1989) (suggesting that punitive damages 
serve to provide remedies for non-compensatory losses); Robert Cooter, Punitive Damages, 
Social Norms, and Economic Analysis, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 73, 75 (1997) (describing 
dignitary torts as a “narrow class” of cases in which the common law provided for 
punitive damages). 
 3. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 938–39 (“Although tort law often is 
concerned to address conduct that causes physical harms or property damage, it is a mistake to 
suppose that these forms of injury have a special claim to being central to the subject of torts. . 
. . Even battery is not precisely concerned with physical harm. Rather, it is the wrong of 
invading another person’s personal space . . . irrespective of whether the touching causes 
harm.”); see also Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal 
Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1404–05 (1993); Anthony J. Sebok, What Did Punitive 
Damages Do?, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 163 (2003). 
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debate in tort theory have contributed to a flawed understanding of 
the concept of injury. 
Today’s informed consent law has evolved with a hybrid of 
dignitary and compensatory purposes. Courts originally recognized 
patient claims against physicians who performed unauthorized 
procedures under battery law. But, starting in the mid-twentieth 
century, courts began to decide such cases under negligence. I will 
argue that this shift has resulted in a class of factually injured patients 
who have no remedy under current law, with consequences for our 
broader understanding of tort injury. The bright line between 
dignitary and bodily injuries imposed by compensation theory 
ignores the extent to which dignitary harms may constitute physical 
injuries. While civil recourse theory is better on this point, it too has 
problems. Most significantly, its concept of a “completed” injury 
inconsistently recognizes the expressive component of bodily torts. 
To understand the practical costs of inadequately defining injury, 
consider the story of one breast cancer patient. 
When Carolyn Alford arrived at the hospital on the morning she 
was to receive a biopsy on a lump in her breast, she asked her doctor 
if he thought the surgery would “go OK.”4 She recalls that he 
replied, “Why, you’ll be talking to your husband by 10 or even 
10:30.”5 According to Alford, the doctor said nothing to suggest the 
possibility of his performing a mastectomy. When she woke up to a 
burning pain stretching from her armpit down to her waist and a 
clock that read four o’clock, Alford “knew the worst had 
happened.”6 The surgeon had found a malignant tumor, though 
(according to Alford) one the size of a BB, which did not appear to 
have spread.7 With only her husband’s permission, the surgeon 
removed Alford’s breast, both pectoral muscles, chest wall, and the 
lymph glands under her arm.8 Beyond those losses, as Alford would 
subsequently testify to Congress, “I LOST CONTROL. Just because 
 
 4. Progress in Controlling Breast Cancer: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health and 
Long-Term Care of the Select Comm. on Aging, H.R., 98th Cong. 46 (1984) (statement of 
Carolyn Alford) (quoted in Carolyn Montini, Gender and Emotion in the Advocacy for Breast 
Cancer Informed Consent Legislation 10 GENDER & SOC’Y 9, 18 (1996)). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
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a person is put to sleep, he should not lose control of their 
[sic] life.”9 
Alford’s nightmare occurred in the early 1980s. This was before 
the start of a nation-wide lobbying effort to protect breast cancer 
patients from physicians performing mastectomies without providing 
information about other, less invasive options such as lumpectomies. 
At the time, because the mastectomy itself had been successful, 
Alford had no legal recourse for the fact that she was given 
inadequate information about the range of potential treatment 
options before going under. Due in part to an increased cultural 
concern for patient autonomy in the face of potential overreaching 
by doctors (including, in some states, legislation on informed 
decision-making10), stories as dramatic as Alford’s are less frequent 
today, though still not eradicated.11 In fact, her testimony about loss 
of control serves to illustrate a type of harm commonly associated 
with a physician’s failure to obtain a patient’s informed consent, 
which today remains imperfectly protected by the tort regime. 
In addition to physical injury such as the loss of a breast, a 
patient like Alford clearly suffers psychological harm: she has had her 
will overborne by a physician in the context of a deeply intimate and 
potentially identity-changing decision. Even in cases less dramatic 
than a mastectomy, a patient suffers this harm when his physician 
performs a procedure more invasive than what he would have chosen 
with more information. In general, tort law recognizes damages for 
psychological harm under the doctrine of negligent infliction of 
emotional distress (NIED). However, psychological harms cannot 
 
 9. Id. (emphasis added). 
 10. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 109277 (2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 458.324, 
459.0125 (West 2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-34-21 (2005); HAW. REV. STAT. § 671-3 (1993 
& Supp. 2006); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT.2310/2310-345 (2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-
2836(m) (2002); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.935 (West 2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§40:1300.151–.154 (2001); MD. ANN. CODE, HEALTH–GEN. § 20-113 (LexisNexis 2005); 
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. § 14-404 (LexisNexis 2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
111 § 70E(h) (West 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.17013–.17513 (2001); MINN. STAT. § 
144.651(9) (2006); MO. REV. STAT. § 376.1250 (2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-3-333 
(2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2-168, 45:9-22.3a, .3b; N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§2404–
2409 (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2007); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§5641–5642 (West 2007); 
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 86.001–.005, .011–.012 (West2001 & Supp. 2006); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2971 (2005), W. VA. CODE § 16-33-1 to -12 (2006). 
 11. See Rachael Andersen-Watts, The Failure of Breast Cancer Informed Consent Statutes, 
14 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 201, 209–10 (2008); Carl E. Schneider, After Autonomy, 41 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 411, 420–21 (2006); Clarence H. Braddock et al, Informed Decision Making 
in Outpatient Practice: Time to Get Back to Basics, 282 JAMA 2313 (1999). 
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usually form the sole basis for a tort claim in the absence of physical 
injury or threat thereof.12 Therefore, most patients cannot recover 
under NIED unless their unauthorized procedure has in some way 
gone wrong. Under the earlier battery standard a patient could have 
recovered for the pure “dignitary” harm of having been touched 
without consent. But today’s negligence standard requires a showing 
of physical injury to state a claim. 
The problem is that the current law ignores patients whose 
physical injuries are not readily apparent. Yet patients who have made 
decisions without adequate information have often suffered physical 
damage as a result of psychological harm. As I will demonstrate, the 
literature in the newly developing field of narrative medicine suggests 
that a patient’s experience of lack of control over his treatment can 
itself contribute to physical harm. The tort system currently ignores 
this insofar as it defines a legally cognizable injury for the purposes of 
establishing a claim of negligence with respect to informed consent. 
Recognizing this injury would therefore fundamentally change how 
certain informed consent cases come out and at least partially resolve 
a number of theoretical problems with the negligence test. 
In this Article I argue that the current law of informed consent in 
the medical malpractice context is based on an excessively narrow 
idea of physical harm, which has negative consequences for tort law. 
Tort scholars can understand the nature of this harm better by 
considering, through the wrongs-based framework of civil recourse 
theory, what the field of narrative medicine reveals about the 
importance of patient subjectivity to physical healing. In Part II, I 
demonstrate how the current understanding of injury under 
informed consent law is the product of a haphazard historical 
evolution from the doctrinal framework of battery to that of 
negligence. In Part III, I show how the current definition of injury 
under the negligence framework fails for a number of reasons. First, 
it ignores new medical understandings about the physical harms that 
occur when physicians interfere with a patient’s particular illness 
 
 12.  Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A (1965) (“If the actor’s conduct is 
negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing either bodily harm or emotional 
disturbance to another, and it results in such emotional disturbance alone, without bodily harm 
or other compensable damage, the actor is not liable for such emotional disturbance.” (emphasis 
added)) with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 47 (“An actor 
whose negligent conduct causes serious emotional harm to another is subject to liability to the 
other if the conduct . . . places the other in danger of immediate bodily harm and the 
emotional harm results from the danger.”). 
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narrative. Second, the definition of injury in these cases is 
inconsistent with the expression of subjective values in other areas of 
tort law. And, third, it distorts the doctor-patient relationship by 
inappropriately evaluating a patient’s desire for information by a 
“reasonable man” standard. Because this standard arose in other 
areas of tort law, it assumes the existence of information in the first 
place and is therefore inappropriate in the informed consent context. 
In Part IV, I propose a new standard and the remedial rules to 
support it. 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF INFORMED CONSENT DOCTRINE 
Most cases of informed consent are less black and white than 
Carolyn Alford’s unconscious mastectomy. The question that forms 
the basis for a tort claim in such cases frequently arises in a far greyer 
space: whether the physician provided enough information about a 
course of treatment and its alternatives to render the patient’s 
consent to such a treatment valid. When a physician’s failure to 
obtain consent was first recognized as a tort in the early twentieth 
century, it was understood to relate to the duty to respect autonomy: 
an uninformed medical procedure, insofar as it is a usurpation of a 
patient’s bodily integrity, was considered a battery.13 The law 
assumed that the wrong suffered by a non-consenting patient was 
not a quantifiable loss requiring compensation in the amount of its 
value, but an intentionally inflicted dignitary wrong recognized as 
such regardless of whether physical harm resulted.14 Indeed, under 
today’s regime, a procedure performed without consent (as opposed 
to consent obtained in the absence of full information) remains a 
battery.15 As the doctrine of informed consent evolved over the 
course of the century, courts—due in part to a reluctance to hold 
physicians accountable in battery for the primarily well-intentioned 
exercise of their medical judgment—shifted to a negligence standard, 
 
 13. See, e.g., Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (“Every 
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with 
his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s consent, 
commits an  assault . . . .”). 
 14. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 938. 
 15. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“It is the settled 
rule that therapy not authorized by the patient may amount to a tort—a common law 
battery—by the physician.” (citing Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1941) and 
cases collected in W. E. Shipley, Annotation, Liability of Physician or Surgeon for Extending 
Operation or Treatment Beyond that Expressly Authorized,56 A.L.R.2d 695, 697–99 (1957)). 
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asking three questions: First, whether a physician breached his duty 
to provide an adequate amount of information to the patient. 
Second, whether the patient would have made a different treatment 
decision in the absence of this breach. And, third, whether a legally 
cognizable injury resulted from the treatment.16 In this section I will 
survey the continued theoretical justifications for recognizing 
informed consent torts in the first place and demonstrate how they 
serve as a basis for a false dichotomy as to the values at stake. I will 
then briefly explain the evolution of the tort from its origins in 
battery to the current negligence standard. 
A. A Tale of Two Duties: Autonomy and Beneficence 
The debate about the amount of information a physician must 
disclose to a patient while obtaining consent has centered in large 
part around two core values related to a physician’s duty to his 
patient: beneficence (the duty to do good), and respect for patient 
autonomy.17 Due to the fact that a physician’s judgment of what 
constitutes the most medically beneficent course of treatment may 
go against a patient’s personal preference, courts and scholars 
frequently discuss these two values as potentially in conflict.18 
 
 16. See, e.g., Canterbury, 464 F.2d at791. 
 17. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL 
ETHICS 12 (5th ed. 2001). 
 18. See, e.g., Jaime Staples King & Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent: 
The Case for Shared Medical Decision-Making, 32 AM. J.L. &MED. 429, 435 (2006) (“The 
most challenging dilemma in establishing an effective informed consent practice is balancing a 
physician’s obligation to protect the patient’s health through beneficence and the physician’s 
obligation to respect the patient’s autonomy.”); Jay Katz, Human Experimentation and 
Human Rights, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 7, 19 (1993) (“[T]he argument goes, any respect for 
patient autonomy must be balanced against the principle of beneficence, of caring for the 
suffering patient who happens to be also a subject of research. In countless conversations with 
physician-investigators, I have heard paternalism and beneficence, and not respect for 
autonomy, defended as guiding principles for the conduct of research.”); Alison Patrucco 
Barnes, Beyond Guardianship Reform: A Reevaluation of Autonomy and Beneficence for a 
System of Principled Decision-Making in Long-Term Care, 41 EMORY L.J. 633, 668 (1992) 
(noting that two sets of laws governing the durable power of attorney for health care 
“represent two fundamentally different approaches to proxy decision-making. The Florida laws 
are rooted in the principle of autonomy, while the principle of beneficence is central to the 
English system.”); Sharona Hoffman, The Use of Placebos in Clinical Trials: Responsible 
Research or Unethical Practice?, 33 CONN. L. REV. 449, 451 (2001) (“It is arguable that the 
doctrine of beneficence militates against the inclusion of placebos in clinical trials under most if 
not all circumstances. . . . By contrast, the doctrine of human autonomy might support 
unrestricted use of placebo controls . . . . Arguably, patients, as autonomous, self-determining 
agents, should be free to choose to participate in studies in which they might forgo treatment 
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The legal recognition of autonomy as a value apart from bodily 
integrity reinforces the dichotomy between the two already reflected 
in the ethical literature on a physician’s duties to a patient. In The 
Principles of Bioethics, Tom Beauchamp and James Childress identify 
four principles that should direct medical practice: autonomy, 
beneficence, non-malfeasance, and justice.19 In considering these 
values, the literature on informed consent has largely been directed 
at the problem of what to do when these values come into conflict,20 
or at least to making the assertion that they may, at times, 
be complimentary.21 
The famous fundamental maxim of the Hippocratic tradition in 
medicine is primum non nocere: “above all, do no harm,” more 
precisely formulated as “help, or at least do no harm.”22 The central 
demand of what it means to be a doctor, therefore, is the provision 
of benefit beyond simply avoiding harm.23 In the attempt to fulfill 
this foundational duty, some physicians will accept a patient’s refusal 
of treatment as valid, while others may ignore the fact that they have 
not received informed consent and attempt to benefit the patient 
through the medical intervention they deem appropriate.24 
Most legal and ethical theories of informed consent, however, 
name “respect for autonomy” as the activating moral principle, 
rooted in the liberal Western tradition of individual freedom over 
“political life and personal development.”25 This principle relates to 
 
even at the risk of sacrificing their own health and welfare.”); Ken Marcus Gatter, Protecting 
Patient-Doctor Discourse: Informed Consent and Deliberative Autonomy, 78 OR. L. REV. 941, 
955 n.51 (1999) (“The Hippocratic Oath has meant different things to physicians practicing in 
different times. Therefore, if the dominant ethic is beneficence, then physicians can use the 
Hippocratic Oath to justify withholding information for the patient’s own good. In contrast, 
under a dominant ethic of autonomy, a physician may interpret the Hippocratic Oath as 
promoting the candid disclosure and discussion of information to patients.”). 
 19. BEAUCHAMP &CHILDRESS, supra note 17, at 12. 
 20. See supra note 18. 
 21. See Edmund D. Pellegrino, Autonomy, Beneficence, and the Experimental Subject’s 
Consent: A Response to Jay Katz, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 55, 60–61 (1993) (“To override, ignore 
or coerce the patient’s autonomous wishes is to do harm to his dignity as a rational human 
being. . . . [B]eneficence is the safeguard of autonomy as autonomy is the safeguard 
of beneficence.”). 
 22. See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 193–94 (1979); 
JOHN D. HODSON, THE ETHICS OF LEGAL COERCION xiii (1983). 
 23. RUTH R. FADEN &TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED 
CONSENT 10 (1986). 
 24. Id. at 13. 
 25. Id. at 7. Faden and Beauchamp identify the principles relevant to informed consent 
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such values as privacy, voluntariness, self-mastery, and the general 
ability to choose and accept responsibility for the outcomes of one’s 
choice.26 As Ruth Faden and Tom Beauchamp note in their 
comprehensive study of the relationship between autonomy and 
informed consent, “autonomy has come to refer to personal self-
governance: personal rule of the self by adequate understanding 
while remaining free from controlling interferences by others and 
from personal limitations that prevent choice.”27 In the context of 
informed consent, Faden and Beauchamp argue that a physician can 
fail to respect autonomy in a number of ways, from intentionally 
concealing medical information to refusing to recognize a patient’s 
desire to forgo a particular course of treatment.28 Autonomy is 
controversial in its potential conflict with other values, such as public 
health concerns and financial constraints, which are justified by 
“some competing moral principle such as beneficence or justice.”29 
The legal debates over informed consent throughout the last 
several decades have turned on the vindication of patient autonomy, 
and in particular on autonomy as an emotional value from the 
perspective of the patients. During the 1980s, for example, sixteen 
states passed breast cancer informed consent laws after increasing 
 
as respect for autonomy, beneficence, and justice. Id. See also King & Moulton, supra note 18, 
at 436 (observing that “autonomy has been given substantial priority over the other ethical 
principles, including beneficence” because “1) protecting autonomy is more easily aligned with 
existing legal principles and precedents; 2) promoting patient autonomy may relieve the 
physician of some responsibility and liability; 3) emphasizing patient autonomy coincides with 
and supports with the recent shift toward consumerism in medicine; and 4) promoting 
autonomy appears less paternalistic than beneficence, but still permits physicians to control the 
flow of information”). 
 26. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 23, at 8. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 9. Faden and Beauchamp posit two different conceptions of informed consent: 
“effective consent,” referring to following the legal and procedural requirements of obtaining a 
patient’s formal permission, and “autonomous authorization,” premised upon the three criteria 
of intentionality, understanding, and noncontrol (the third criterion compromised by 
informational manipulation on the part of a physician). Id. at 238. Within this second 
framework, informed consent does not merely facilitate autonomy; rather, the act of making an 
autonomous authorization—even to the extent of ceding bodily autonomy—is autonomy in 
and of itself. Id. Emerging from this model is the concern that efforts on the parts of physicians 
directed purely to obtaining “effective consent” occlude consent in the second, more morally 
significant form. Autonomy becomes a value to be advanced in its own right, not merely to 
comply with the governing law, but because patients—already robbed by illness of much of 
their opportunity to act autonomously, should be assisted by their doctors in doing so to the 
greatest extent possible (or allowed to decide to cede autonomy if that is their choice). 
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public outcry over the common practice of physicians performing 
radical mastectomies without informing patients of the risks and 
benefits of less invasive forms of treatment.30 In her study of the role 
of gender and emotion in the state congressional debates over this 
legislation, Theresa Montini found that both proponents and 
opponents shared the belief that women are more emotional than 
men, and that this belief shaped the strategies developed by the 
activists and contributed to their effectiveness.31 As Montini noted, 
one sponsoring legislator urged that an increased amount of 
information be given to breast cancer patients as a partial antidote to 
their terror: “The patient in whom a breast cancer diagnosis has been 
made is a terribly frightened woman, frantic with anxiety, feeling 
alone, forlorn and forsaken. Can a woman in such an emotional state 
be adequately advised and informed on what is to happen if the 
biopsy is unfavorable?”32 
Conversely, as Montini points out, “physician groups in 
opposition to breast cancer informed consent argued that if the 
legislation was passed, women would be too emotional to be able to 
handle their choices.”33 As one physician put it, 
No matter how informed the patient is regarding treatment 
modalities for the various tissue diagnoses of “breast cancer” and its 
metastases, the choice of treatment can be colored by affect. If a 
woman’s self-esteem is strongly tied to her body image, 
assimilation of volumes of scientific research will not alter this fact 
in her decision-making.34 
This view assumes that “affect” is a wholly separate category of 
consideration from bodily well-being, and that autonomy, or 
“choice,” is necessarily a threat to beneficence. In reality, this 
dichotomy misses their interrelation.35 
In the first place, autonomy is not an entirely solitary value, but 
is in fact socially embedded; our social interactions and our 
 
 30. Montini, supra note 4, at 9. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 16 (quoting Edythe C. Harrison & Lois Stovall-Hurdle, “A Woman Has an 
Inherent Right.”, 109 VA. MED. 748 (1982)). 
 33. Montini, supra note 4, at 17. 
 34. Eloise Haun, The Unconscious Breast, 109 VA. MED. 750, 753 (1982). 
 35. This has the collateral consequence, at least in the breast cancer context, of 
enshrining problematic gender stereotypes in legal and political discourse. 
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relationships affect our autonomous decision-making processes.36 
Because relationships shape the exercise and experience of 
autonomy,37 it is incoherent to say that beneficence begins where 
autonomy ends. The physician, through the provision of information 
to the patient, inherently participates in his decision-making 
autonomy. (The relational quality of patient autonomy is particularly 
illustrated by the fact that patients with bad medical outcomes are 
much less likely to sue if their physician apologizes to them for his 
negligence.)38 Likewise, as I will describe in Part III, the exercise of 
autonomy can in and of itself have critical positive physical effects 
and thus contribute to a physician’s seemingly separate duty 
of beneficence. 
To show how the blackletter law of informed consent has come 
to miss this complex relationship, I will briefly describe the evolution 
of informed consent doctrine. 
B. Informed Consent from Battery to Negligence 
Because an unwanted medical procedure inherently violates a 
patient’s bodily integrity, early cases recognizing the physician’s legal 
obligation to obtain consent sounded in battery rather than 
negligence. Courts treated procedures performed without consent as 
intentional, unwanted touchings.39 In the foundational 1905 case 
Mohr v. Williams, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a 
surgeon’s game-time decision to operate on his patient’s left ear 
violated the patient’s “right to himself,” which right prohibited 
interference with the bodily integrity of a patient 
without permission.40 
About a decade later, in Schloendorff v. Society of New York 
Hospitals, the New York Court of Appeals, speaking through Judge 
 
 36. Catriona MacKenzie, Imagining Oneself Otherwise, in RELATIONAL AUTONOMY: 
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON AUTONOMY, AGENCY, AND THE SOCIAL SELF 126, 143 (Catriona 
MacKenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000). 
 37. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAW’S RELATIONS: A RELATIONAL THEORY OF SELF, 
AUTONOMY AND LAW 279 (2011). 
 38. See, e.g., Benjamin Ho & Elaine Liu, Does Sorry Work? The Impact of Apology Laws 
on Medical Malpractice, 43 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 141, 163 (2011); Jennifer Robbennolt, 
Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination, 102 MICH. L. REV. 460 (2003); 
Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Medical Error, 467 CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS & 
RELATED RES. 376 (2009). 
 39. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 cmt. d, illus. 1 (1963–64). 
 40. 104 N.W. 12, 14–15 (Minn. 1905). 
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Cardozo, provided an iconic statement about the relationship 
between the receipt of informed consent by a doctor and the 
potentially tortious or even criminal nature of treatment: “Every 
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine 
what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs 
an operation without his patient’s consent commits an assault 
. . . .”41 Schloendorff made it clear that the cause of action under 
battery was based upon the violation of the body itself, not upon any 
particular physical injury arising from the unwanted touching.42 In 
that sense the cause of action served a punitive, rather than 
compensatory, function. 
Over the decades that followed, however, courts moved away 
from the battery standard and its emphasis on bodily integrity 
towards a negligence standard that conceptualized the failure to 
provide information as interference with the more abstract value of 
patient autonomy—but only in cases where bodily injury resulted.43 
Tort scholars have proposed several reasons to account for this shift. 
They include: (1) the fact that battery allows for very few defenses; 
(2) that judges preferred to base the legal standard on physician 
practice rather than theory; (3) that a negligence standard permitted 
judges to defer to the collective wisdom of the medical profession; 
(4) that negligence law places a higher burden of proof on plaintiffs 
and could therefore deter frivolous claims; and (5) that the tort of 
battery has a criminal counterpart that could leave physicians 
vulnerable to prosecution.44 The new test had the further benefit of 
shielding physicians from personal exposure to intentional tort 
claims, which malpractice insurance does not generally cover. I 
would characterize this shift away from battery as implicitly 
recognizing that a physician’s choices about disclosure and treatment 
advice implicate aspects of his own professional identity. Therefore 
the rights of the physician as a legal person may come into tension 
with the autonomous aspects of the patient’s personhood. The 
physician, after all, must attempt to act in accordance with the full 
range of his Hippocratic obligations, many of which require him to 
make highly subjective judgments about the content of 
“beneficence” in a particular case. 
 
 41. 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914). 
 42. Id. 
 43. See King & Moulton, supra note 18, at 434, 438–39. 
 44. See JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 68–69 (2002). 
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The 1957 California case Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University 
Board of Trustees45 provided one of the first coherent formulations of 
the concern for a patient’s interest in self-determination, conceived 
as a psychological need weighed against bodily welfare and the 
related concern of causing unnecessary alarm by informing a patient 
of highly remote risks of treatment. The doctor, the court said, must 
“recognize that each patient presents a separate problem, that the 
patient’s mental and emotional condition is important and in certain 
cases may be crucial, and that in discussing the element of risk a 
certain amount of discretion must be employed consistent with the 
full disclosure of facts . . . .”46 This language—contemplating both 
the idiosyncratic preferences of the patient and the similarly variable 
exercise of professional discretion on the part of the physician—
emphasizes the highly relational nature of the tort. In other words, 
determining when the physician’s subjective interpretation of his 
professional duty becomes legally subordinate to the particular 
patient’s subjective needs requires consideration of the highly 
personal relationship between the two parties. 
In the years since Salgo, state statutory law on informed consent 
has espoused, though unevenly, this concern for the free will of a 
patient in decision-making and the honesty of the doctor in 
providing information relevant to that decision.47 Such concern has 
been a twentieth-century phenomenon, reactive to a history in which 
doctors’ authority to determine a course of treatment—and even to 
withhold information from a patient about the severity of his 
condition—had been paramount.48 A number of social forces appear 
responsible for this shift: the Civil Rights movement inaugurated an 
era of “unwillingness to accede to the discretionary authority of 
whites, men, husbands, parents, clinical investigators . . . and, of 
course doctors. . . . Autonomy and consent became the bywords.”49 
Yet, even as courts have started to recognize that informed consent 
implicates a patient’s unique psychological needs, by shifting away 
 
 45.  317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957). 
 46. Id. at 181 (emphasis added). 
 47. See King & Moulton, supra note 18, at 439. 
 48. See Daniel K. Sokol, How the Doctor’s Nose Has Shortened Over Time; A Historical 
Overview of the Truth-Telling Debate in the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 99 J. ROYAL SOC’Y 
MED. 632, 633 (2006) (explaining the twentieth-century shift in candor towards patients). See 
also Denis H. Novack et al., Physicians’ Attitudes Toward Using Deception to Resolve Difficult 
Ethical Problems, 261 JAMA 2980, 2980 (1989). 
 49. KATZ, supra note 44, at 3. 
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from a pure battery standard they have effectively narrowed the 
circumstances under which these needs can be vindicated. 
Under today’s malpractice law, a patient who seeks recovery for 
having been treated with inadequate informed consent must prove 
three elements: first, that the physician failed to disclose any risk in 
the recommended treatment or the existence of any alternative 
method of treatment; second, that the patient would have foregone 
the recommended treatment had he or she known of the undisclosed 
information; and, third, that as a result of the recommended 
treatment the patient actually suffered an injury that would not have 
occurred had the patient opted for one of the undisclosed methods 
of treatment.50 (An exception to this standard—which this article 
does not challenge—is the rule that allows physicians to provide 
treatment in the absence of informed consent in emergency 
situations.51) The most critical pragmatic difference between the 
battery and negligence standards is that the latter, unlike the former, 
depends on the existence of a physical injury. 
Much of the scholarly debate over informed consent has centered 
on the first prong of the informed consent test: specifically, on 
whether the scope of a physician’s duty to disclose should be 
measured by the standards of the medical community or of the 
reasonable patient.52 The states split down the middle between these 
two standards, and the debate between them has generally focused 
on how to balance beneficence and autonomy.53 Twenty-five states 
employ a “professional” or “physician-based” standard for informed 
consent, meaning that a doctor is required to inform a patient of the 
risks, benefits, and alternatives to a treatment in the manner that a 
“reasonably prudent practitioner” would.54 In twenty-three states 
and the District of Columbia the standard is whether a physician has 
provided the information on the risks, benefits, and alternatives that 
a “reasonable patient” would deem material to making a decision 
 
 50. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 51. Id. at 788–89. 
 52.  Compare Tashman v. Gibbs, 556 S.E.2d 772, 777 (Va. 2002), with Canterbury, 
464 F.2d at 785. 
 53. For a summary of the laws of the various states, see King & Moulton, supra note 18, 
at 493–501. 
 54. Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (Kan. 1960); see also Salgo v. Leland 
Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957); Tashman, 556 S.E.2d 
at 777. 
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about treatment.55 While some scholars laud the “reasonable 
patient” standard for better protecting patient autonomy than does 
its chief alternative, as I will discuss next in Part III, neither standard 
accurately captures the nature of the harm to personhood at stake in 
an informed consent case, or the effects of knowledge on a patient’s 
bodily wellbeing. 
III. THE INADEQUACY OF THE INJURY STANDARD 
The decision of courts to move informed consent doctrine into 
the realm of negligence was a compromise designed to fix, for good 
reason, some limits on physician liability. Yet it cannot account for 
the basic fact that led courts to recognize non-consensual treatment 
as a battery in the first place: a victim of an unwanted touching has 
had his body violated regardless of the “reasonableness” of his 
reasons for not wanting it. Furthermore, the negligence regime only 
allows for recovery in cases where an “injury” has occurred, 
precluding claims by patients whose “only” injury was a medical 
procedure, however invasive, with a medically acceptable outcome. 
In this section I will argue that, regardless of whether the operative 
standard of duty is physician-based or “reasonable patient”-based, 
the negligence test for informed consent leaves many patients 
without remedy for physical injuries. 
Early informed consent cases focusing on bodily violation as the 
core wrong seem to grasp that a patient who agrees to a procedure 
he would not have undergone had he been informed, or better 
informed, has been wronged per se, regardless of how successful the 
procedure was on its own terms.56 And it certainly stands to reason 
that, if gently touching someone, with good intentions and to no 
detrimental physical effect, is a non-controversial example of a 
battery, how much more invasive is a surgery, which potentially 
restrains the patient’s movements for weeks or months, interrupts 
her professional and personal commitments, and is frequently 
accompanied by substantial physical pain and unpleasant aesthetic 
costs such as scarring? These effects result from even the most 
 
 55. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 784 (“Respect for the patient’s right of self-determination 
on particular therapy demands a standard set by law for physicians rather than one which 
physicians may or may not impose upon themselves.”); see also King & Moulton, supra note 
18, at 493–501. 
 56. For a discussion of the early cases treated as torts in battery, see Milton Oppenheim, 
Informed Consent to Medical Treatment, 11 CLEV.-MARSHALL L. REV. 249, 253–54 (1962). 
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successful procedures, and yet all necessitate a dramatically greater 
degree of violence to the patient’s body than gentle touching. 
Yet, by embracing the negligence standard for informed consent, 
courts have been understandably reluctant to hold doctors liable for 
good faith actions undertaken for the patient’s benefit.57 As noted 
above, the physician’s own legal identity with its accompanying duty 
of beneficence is implicated in this trade-off. Just as a patient’s 
subjective experience may be relevant to the scope of injury, a 
physician’s subjective judgment may be relevant to the execution of 
his duty. Furthermore, because malpractice insurance generally does 
not cover intentional torts, a battery standard would leave physicians 
personally on the hook for the full extent of their liability in 
such cases.58 
Yet these motivations are arguably insufficient to deny recovery 
for an act properly understood as a battery. As Grant Morris puts it, 
“The absence of hostile intent or malicious motive, the absence of an 
intent to injure, or the existence of the defendant’s good faith in 
making the contact does not preclude the imposition of intentional 
tort liability.”59 He further asks whether a “victim [should] be 
denied compensation because the wrongdoer must pay the judgment 
out of his or her own pocket instead of out of the pockets of 
innocent insurance policyholders” and concludes that “[i]f anything, 
a requirement that wrongdoers pay directly instead of spreading the 
loss through insurance better assures that in the future they . . . will 
conform their conduct to the law’s requirements.”60 While Morris’s 
position seems intuitively just on its own terms, it is even more 
compelling if one drills deeper into the nature of the harm redressed 
by informed consent laws and the elements of the negligence test 
itself. Ultimately, I suggest that the current limited definition of 
injury is insufficient for three reasons: the standard ignores the latest 
medical understandings, devalues subjectivity as part of a legal 
wrong, and distorts the doctor-patient relationship. 
 
 57. See Trogun v. Fruchtman, 207 N.W.2d 297, 313 (Wis. 1973). 
 58. See, e.g., Clayburn v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 871 N.Y.S.2d 487, 488–89 
(App. Div. 2009); Baldinger v. Consol. Mut. Ins. Co., 222 N.Y.S.2d 736, 737–38 (App. Div. 
1961), aff’d, 183 N.E.2d 908 (N.Y. 1962).  
 59. Grant H. Morris, Dissing Disclosure: Just What the Doctor Ordered, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 
313, 320 (2002). 
 60. Id. at 322. 
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A. The Standard Ignores the Latest Medical Understandings 
As discussed above, the battery view of informed consent 
doctrine recognized the dignitary nature of the tort inflicted by a 
physician who overrides his patient’s autonomy by performing a 
procedure with inadequate information. The requirement of physical 
injury imposed by the newer negligence standard would seem to 
remove dignitary harms to a patient’s personhood from the realm of 
compensable injuries. In this section, I will demonstrate how 
dignitary harms to a patient’s body do, in and of themselves, cause 
physical injury. By persisting in a dichotomy between “autonomy” 
and “beneficence,” scholars have failed to perceive a class of physical 
harms for which there is currently no compensation available. 
1. The empirical case for the “body self” 
Several areas of medical research show how the brain acts as the 
body’s first line of defense against illness. Due to the nature of the 
mind-body connection, changes in thought and belief systems that 
occur in the brain can result in positive or negative changes to the 
body.61 The medical community has become increasingly aware of 
these interactions in recent years. As psychologist Oakley Ray notes, 
“[t]his new approach to health says loudly and clearly that the 
causes, development, and outcomes of an illness are determined by 
the interaction of psychological, social, and cultural factors with 
biochemistry and physiology.”62 Ray explains that our beliefs 
influence the biology of our bodies and that beliefs and ideas—
regardless of whether real or imaginary—cause bodily responses.63 
Neuropsychiatrist Eric Kandel identified the mechanism through 
which belief impacts biology: “the regulation of gene expression by 
social factors makes all bodily functions, including all functions of 
the brain, susceptible to social influence.”64 For example, the 
distinctly physiological harms caused by stress (or, to use the 
technical term, “allostatic load”) are experienced “when there is an 
inadequate match between an individual’s coping skills and the 
 
 61. Oakley Ray, How the Mind Hurts and Heals the Body, 59 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 29, 
29 (2004). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 32. 
 64. Eric Kandel, A New Intellectual Framework for Psychiatry, 155 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 
457, 461 (1998). 
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environmental demands that the individual believes these skills 
must confront.”65 
Likewise, a number of studies have demonstrated the effects of 
certain kinds of patient narratives on significant illnesses, such as 
cancer. One study found that a breast cancer patient’s likelihood of 
mortality or recurrence of the disease was better predicted by her 
mental attitude three months after surgery than by other “physical” 
factors such as her age, the size of her tumor, or the tumor’s 
histologic grade.66 Women who displayed attitudes characterized as 
“fighting spirit” (the idea that she was going to beat the disease) or 
“denial” (the belief that the mastectomy had only been a precaution) 
had a 50% chance of surviving for fifteen years in good health, as 
opposed to 15% amongst women with attitudes of “stoic 
acceptance,” “hopelessness,” and “anxious preoccupation.”67 A 
subsequent study found that the emotional quality of “helplessness” 
amongst breast cancer patients was linked to mortality: “Patients 
who had a high score on the helpless measure . . . were more likely 
to have relapsed or died during the 5 years” of the study.68 If we 
consider the importance of narrative to coping, which I will discuss 
in the next sub-section, it becomes apparent how neglect of these 
subjective experiences can translate directly into physical harm.69 
Furthermore, as Ray has also stressed, the role of knowledge is 
crucial to the development of coping skills: 
The more an individual knows about the surrounding world, the 
more that person is able to understand, control, and deal effectively 
with it. . . . With knowledge, information, comes an empowerment, 
a belief that the world is understandable, controllable, and friendly. 
Perhaps the most stressful situation is the ambiguity that comes 
 
 65. Ray, supra note 61, at 32. 
 66. S. Greer, Psychological Response to Cancer and Survival, 21 PSYCHOL. MED. 43, 
43 (1991). 
 67. Id. 
 68. M. Watson et al., Influence of Psychological Response on Survival in Breast Cancer: A 
Population-Based Cohort Study, 354 LANCET 1331, 1335 (1999). 
 69. A number of studies have demonstrated the relationship between stress and 
infection. See, e.g., Sheldon Cohen et al., Negative Life Events, Perceived Stress, Negative Affect, 
and Susceptibility to the Common Cold, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 131 (1993); 
Sheldon Cohen, Psychological Stress, Immunity, and Upper Respiratory Infections, 5 CURRENT 
DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 86 (1996); Bahi Takkouche et al., A Cohort Study of Stress and the 
Common Cold, 12 EPIDEMIOLOGY 345 (2001). 
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from an awareness that one has inadequate and 
incomplete information.70 
Ronny Frishman has concluded that patients who exerted “more 
control” during visits to the doctor had improved health over those 
who did not.71 Ashis body of research has begun to create a new 
understanding of the general relationship between physical health 
and mental attitudes about health, so has the burgeoning school of 
thought known as “narrative medicine” begun to look at what 
specific narratives patients tell about their illnesses and how their 
interactions with their doctors could affect these narratives.72 
2. Narrative control as a component of bodily well-being 
Research into the way patients use narrative to manage the 
physical effects of their illness has provided a more nuanced 
understanding of the importance of a patient’s subjective 
interpretation of his suffering to the process of healing.73 In The 
 
 70. Ray, supra note 61, at 33. Ray goes on to note the linear relationship between an 
increase in years of education and a decline in mortality rate. Id. (citing Theodore Pincus et al., 
Social Conditions and Self-Management Are More Powerful Determinants of Health than Access 
to Care, 129 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 406 (1998)). 
 71. Ronny Frishman, Quality of Care: Don’t Be a Wimp in the Doctor’s Office, 21 HARV. 
HEALTH LETTER 1, 1–2 (1996). 
 72. Broadly speaking, “narrative medicine” describes the practice of medicine with the 
narrative competence to recognize, absorb, interpret, and be moved by the stories of illness, a 
movement arising in part to combat the accusation that a doctor’s capacity to empathize with 
and respect the suffering of his patient and to attend to the patient’s individual account of his 
illness actually diminishes with medical training. RITA CHARON, NARRATIVE MEDICINE: 
HONORING THE STORIES OF ILLNESS 3, 8 (2006) [hereinafter CHARON, STORIES OF ILLNESS] 
(citing JODI HALPERN, FROM DETACHED CONCERN TO EMPATHY: HUMANIZING MEDICAL 
PRACTICE (2001)). A 1984 study, for example, found that the average amount of time 
between the opening of an interview with a patient and the doctor’s first interruption was 18 
seconds. Howard B. Beckman & Richard M. Frankel, The Effect of Physician Behavior on the 
Collection of Data, 101 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 692, 694 (1984). Degree programs such as 
the Program in Narrative Medicine at the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Columbia 
University endeavor to bring the lessons of literary scholarship, psychology, and anthropology 
to bear upon the practice of medicine: namely, that “[u]sing narrative knowledge enables a 
person to understand the plight of another by participating in his or her story with complex 
skills of imagination, interpretation, and recognition.” CHARON, STORIES OF ILLNESS, supra, 
at 9–10. 
 73. There is, it should be noted, much to be gained by the physician, in addition to the 
patient, from recognizing patient subjectivity when recommending treatment. Rita Charon has 
written about the increasingly adverse relationship between doctor and patient resulting from 
the rise of often legally trained bioethicists whose mediation of the relationship has been a 
result of the postmodern, autonomy-focused approach to patients’ rights. CHARON, STORIES 
OF ILLNESS, supra note 72, at 205. To solve this problem, she proposes an inter-subjective 
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Wounded Storyteller, sociologist Arthur Frank begins his account of 
the relationship between illness and storytelling with the insight that 
at the heart of illness is a fundamental loss of bodily control and that 
ill people have widely differing abilities to adapt to this crisis of 
control.74 As Frank notes “[a] body’s place on the continuum of 
control depends not only on the physiological possibility of 
predictability or contingency, but also on how the person chooses to 
interpret this physiology.”75 Frank utilizes the concept of individuals 
as hybrid “body-selves.”76 In this view, an ill person’s well-being is, 
in part, the product of his undeniable physical loss of control and his 
psychological willingness to accept this loss of control.77 
Frank goes on to describe the role of storytelling in repairing the 
damage to the body-self caused by the assault of illness: “Stories have 
to repair the damage that illness has done to the ill person’s sense of 
where she is in life, and where she may be going. Stories are a way of 
redrawing maps and finding new destinations.”78 For Frank, 
narratives allow a sufferer to attempt to repair the interruption to self 
caused by illness and to find a way to integrate his potentially 
diminished bodily state into a new subjective identity moving 
 
dialogue in which both patient and physician transcend the limitations of the traditional clinical 
relationship. For Charon, “narrative medicine provides the means to understand the personal 
connections between patient and physician” as well as “the meaning of medical practice for the 
individual physician.” Rita Charon, Narrative Medicine: A Model for Empathy, Reflection, 
Profession, and Trust, 286 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1897, 1897 (2001). Charon seems to conclude 
that through narrative exchange with patients, a physician may contribute to the development 
of ethical imperatives without the necessity of a mediating legal framework: “The ethicality of 
narrative medicine . . . emerges directly and organically from its practice and need not have a 
separate ‘bioethics’ function appended to it.” CHARON, STORIES OF ILLNESS, supra note 72, at 
210. This call for attention to and participation in the subjective meanings a patient assigns to 
illness and treatment is, of course, crucial—if done well it could address the vast majority of the 
concerns I have raised in the first part of this paper. Until such attention becomes an 
established feature of the medical community, however, it cannot replace the need for 
subjective accountability in our legal treatment of malpractice claims. Furthermore, as doctors 
who are sued for malpractice in the first place are disproportionately those described as 
inattentive to patients’ voices, the burdens of a patient-centered standard would fall largely on 
the shoulders of those most deserving it, and those least likely to become willing participants in 
the sort of practice Charon advocates. MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF 
THINKING WITHOUT THINKING 43 (2005). 
 74. ARTHUR FRANK, THE WOUNDED STORYTELLER: BODY, ILLNESS, AND ETHICS 
30 (1995). 
 75. Id. at 32. 
 76. Id. at 28–29. 
 77.  Id. at 30. 
 78. Id. at 53. 
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forward. Frank has identified three major types of narratives patients 
commonly use to organize their experiences of illness, noting that 
most people will use more than just one, though to varying degrees. 
The first, most common, is the “restitution narrative,” which has 
the storyline: “Yesterday I was healthy, today I’m sick, but tomorrow 
I’ll be healthy again.”79 This narrative centers on the importance of 
health being restored and the interruption to a patient’s life 
completely reversed. Frank asserts that modern medicine is 
preoccupied with the restitution narrative, obsessed with finding 
“cures” even when none exist.80 As a result, treatment can proceed 
indefinitely at the expense of allowing a sufferer to cease being a 
patient and simply “find her way toward her own version of a 
good death.”81 
The second narrative, the “chaos narrative,” can be better 
described as an “anti-narrative”: “In these stories the modernist 
bulwark of remedy, progress, and professionalism cracks to reveal 
vulnerability, futility, and impotence.”82 In the chaos narrative, 
illness can only be experienced as immediacy, without the possibility 
for narrative reflection.83 Furthermore, as Frank notes, “People living 
these stories regularly accuse medicine of seeking to maintain its 
pretense of control—its restitution narrative—at the expense of 
denying the suffering of what it cannot treat.”84 
In the third narrative, the “quest narrative,” ill storytellers “meet 
suffering head on; they accept illness and seek to use it. Illness is the 
occasion of a journey that becomes a quest.”85 The distinguishing 
feature of a quest narrative is the centrality of the teller, as opposed 
to the remedy (as in restitution) or the disease (as in chaos).86 
 
 79. Id. at 77. 
 80. Id. at 83. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 97. 
 83. Id. at 99. 
 84. Id. at 100. 
 85. Id. at 115. 
 86. As an example of the ethic of recollection, Frank cites author Audre Lorde’s 
narrative of her experiences post-mastectomy, when a nurse disapproved of her failure to wear 
a prosthetic breast, asking that she wear one at least when she came in for appointments out of 
concern for “the morale of the office.” Id. at 121. Lorde describes this remark, to which she 
was initially too distressed to respond, as “only the first such assault on my right to define and 
claim my own body,” id., and Frank describes Lorde’s subsequent re-telling as an ethical 
action, lying in “her willingness to recollect that failure [to respond] and offer it to others with 
an indication of what should have been done.” Id. at 132. Lorde’s account of her conversation 
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Furthermore, because this narrative is a “self-story,” it becomes 
communicative and therefore endowed with outward-looking 
possibilities, which Frank identifies as “recollection,” “solidarity,” 
and “inspiration.”87 
To apply these insights to a specific legal example, consider Mohr 
v. Williams, in which a patient complaining of trouble in her right 
ear consented to a tympanoplasty (the patching of a perforated ear 
drum) and removal of a diseased polyp in her middle ear.88 Once the 
patient was unconscious, the physician examined both ears again and 
discovered that the drum of the left ear, which had not been 
bothering her, was likewise perforated. In the physician’s estimation, 
it needed the surgery more than the right one did which, upon 
closer examination, did not appear as serious as he had previously 
thought.89 He, therefore, performed surgery on the left ear.90 When 
the patient regained consciousness, she found she had suffered 
substantial hearing loss in the left ear, for which she sued the 
physician.91 The case, decided in the patient’s favor, has become 
known for its holding that, in the absence of a life-threatening 
emergency, consent to surgery on one organ does not constitute 
consent to surgery on another. Therefore, even if the hearing loss 
 
with the nurse underscores the relationship between the assault of a disease on a “body-self” 
and the assaultive qualities of its treatment. Unlike a disease, a purveyor of treatment possesses 
intentionality—usually the intention to cause what would otherwise be offensive bodily contact 
were it not for the motive of increasing, rather than decreasing, overall health. But what about 
such statements as the one made by Lorde’s nurse? The nurse clearly exerted no physical 
control over Lorde, but Lorde experienced her words as an assault, not due to any fear of 
physical jeopardy but due to the nurse’s representation of the restitution narrative enforced by 
the medical profession itself and embodied by the doctor’s office. According to this narrative, 
Lorde should wear a prosthetic because doing so would bring her closer to the medical 
conception of “whole” even if it is at the expense of her own agency and self-identity, which 
were better served, from her perspective, by the quest narrative she was attempting to devise 
(one of reclaiming her new body as an integrated identity). That Lorde remained silent yet 
deeply traumatized by what, for her, was a self-destroying narrative of her illness demonstrates 
how the profession’s imposition of a view of illness inconsistent with a patient’s narrative of self 
can have an assaultive quality in its action upon personhood. A physician can, therefore, 
through presenting treatment options without regard to more subjectively appropriate 
alternatives, propose offensive bodily contact under what we should consider to be a false 
assumption of consent, in part because professional medicine may at times attempt to dictate 
the overall terms by which a self may exist in the first place. 
 87. Id. at 132–33. 
 88. Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 13 (Minn. 1905). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
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would have been a foreseeable and non-actionable risk of the surgery 
itself, the patient could recover damages in the absence of consent.92 
We can better understand the Mohr plaintiff’s legal experience by 
thinking of it as a narrative experience: the patient recognized herself 
as unwell and sought a “cure” to restore herself to a state of 
healthiness. Upon waking, however, she found herself deaf in an ear 
she had not even identified as unhealthy. Regardless of whether it 
made good medical sense ex ante to perform the surgery, the doctor 
had turned the patient’s subjective experience into a chaos narrative 
by asserting arbitrary physical control over her. Rendered silent by 
anesthesia (and potentially the gender norms of the time period) as 
to the course of treatment for that part of her body, she found 
herself disabled in a manner impossible to reconcile with the 
restitution narrative covering the course of treatment for the 
originally ailing ear. 
The facts of the case raise further questions than those legally 
relevant to its holding as to damages for the left ear. As the court 
noted, the patient had been so frightened of being put under general 
anesthesia that the surgeon had asked for her family’s general 
practitioner to attend the surgery “under the impression that it 
would allay and calm her fears.”93 (The general practitioner was not 
authorized by the patient to make decisions on her behalf while she 
was unconscious, but his “assent” to the proposed surgery on the left 
ear was cited by the defense as evidence of the patient’s implied 
consent.)94 Furthermore, the doctor determined the supposed non-
seriousness of the right ear’s condition with the same visual 
examination he had performed while the patient was still conscious. 
These facts at least hint at a question unrelated to the surgery on the 
left ear: How necessary was the surgery on the right ear (which the 
patient never subsequently underwent) weighed against the trauma 
of undergoing anesthesia and surrendering bodily autonomy to a 
roomful of strangers? In other words, even if the treatment for the 
proposed ear had unfolded as anticipated by the patient, would it 
have been a false restitution narrative told by the patient’s physicians 
to encourage her consent, masking the underlying chaos of the 
treatment itself? This could well be the case if the proposed 
 
 92. Id. at 15. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
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treatment was both traumatic enough to be so noted by the 
Minnesota Supreme Court and yet so little necessary as to have been 
abandoned by the physician altogether. In other words, even if 
successful, the treatment itself might have been a grosser 
interruption of the patient’s bodily well-being than were the original 
ear pains. 
From today’s medical standpoint, there is almost no way to 
adequately evaluate the patient’s choices in 1905. A tympanoplasty is 
performed to restore hearing and to reduce the risk of infection 
posed by a perforated eardrum. The actual odds of infection 
occurring are difficult to quantify and largely dependent upon the 
patient’s care of the damaged ear.95 (The Mohr plaintiff may have 
undergone the more invasive mastoidectomy, in which an infected 
portion of the mastoid bone is removed.)96 It is further impossible to 
tell from a judicial opinion just how disruptive even a successful 
operation would have been to the specific patient’s life and 
construction of self. It is worth noting that a large number of 
contemporary patients commenting on a message board for those in 
recovery from tympanoplasty and mastoidectomy report, months out 
from the surgery, that they would not have undergone the procedure 
had they known how long it would result in greater hearing loss, 
how difficult to predict the odds of recovering hearing actually were, 
and the duration of the interruption to their professional and 
personal lives and efforts at physical fitness.97 The range of responses 
 
 95. Nat’l Inst. of Health, Ruptured Eardrum, MEDLINE PLUS, 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/001038.htm (last updated May 
18, 2014). 
 96. Nat’l Inst. of Health, Mastoidectomy, MEDLINE PLUS, 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/003016.htm (last updated Aug. 
30, 2012). 
 97. For example: “Now I continue to lead my life with blocking sensation and mild ear 
[sic] loss in affected ear. . . . They also conclude since I am diabetic type 2 it has not healed in 
my case so my question is why do surgery in the first place.” Manjunath Varadaraj, Comment 
to My Tympanoplasty, A Retrospective, RICKY MONDELLO: LIFE ENTHUSIAST (Apr. 18, 2011, 
12:22 AM), http://rmondello.com/2008/08/23/my-tympanoplasty-a-retrospective. “[I] 
think getting the surgery was the worst decision i’ve [sic] ever made in my life. my[sic] hearing 
waz [sic] perfect on both sides but my ear discharged [sic] a yellow liquid but when it dried up 
I [sic] could still hear very clearly. the [sic] doctor said if i didnt [sic] get the surgery then an 
infection could affect it going into my brain. well [sic] now I [sic] had the surgery & ma [sic] 
left ear is not perfect like before but its [sic] still ok.” Femi, Comment to My Tympanoplasty, A 
Retrospective, RICKY MONDELLO: LIFE ENTHUSIAST (Apr. 13, 2009, 9:11PM), 
http://rmondello.com/2008/08/23/my-tympanoplasty-a-retrospective. “Its [sic] hard for 
me not to be active . . . . I just want to be able to return to jogging and swimming. I don’t feel 
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to this surgery make it clear that whether a procedure secures or 
precludes “restitution” or “chaos” varies dramatically from patient 
to patient. 
The weight of this research urges one obvious conclusion: a 
patient may have a wide range of highly subjective reasons for 
accepting or refusing a particular procedure, depending in part on 
his unique approach to his illness and healing. When a physician 
withholds information, she prevents her patient from making the 
best decision consistent with his particular illness narrative. Because 
of the connection between the mind and body and the role of illness 
narratives in physical healing, the physician has thereby imposed a 
physical injury. 
B. The Negligence Standard Devalues Subjectivity as Part of a Legal 
Wrong 
While the discussion of narrative medicine in the preceding 
section may have made it clear that some harm occurs when a doctor 
performs a procedure with inadequate consent, it does not 
necessarily follow that such harm may be recoverable as a tort. Now 
that we understand the physiological mechanisms at work from the 
perspective of the patient, the question becomes whether the 
resulting injury is of the sort properly redressed by the tort system. 
In this section I will first use a civil recourse framework to argue that 
an informed consent violation is indeed such an injury and, in light 
of certain relational qualities, an injury particularly appropriate for 
 
like that day will ever come.” Berm, Comment to My Tympanoplasty, A Retrospective, RICKY 
MONDELLO: LIFE ENTHUSIAST (July 21, 2009 11:51 PM), 
http://rmondello.com/2008/08/23/my-tympanoplasty-a-retrospective. “Now I understand 
that the 97 to 98% success rate means they can restore some kind of hearing with the surgery. 
Tests show that I have restored about 25% of my hearing at 4 feet. Past that everything is very 
distorted . . . . That is one thing that I have noticed about this surgery, there is a lot of not 
really sure and have no idea about the results [sic]. It sure was a lot of discomfort and pain for 
the end result.” Billy Bagby, Comment to My Tympanoplasty, A Retrospective, RICKY 
MONDELLO: LIFE ENTHUSIAST (July 25, 2009, 7:44 PM), http://rmondello.com
/2008/08/23/my-tympanoplasty-a-retrospective. It is interesting to contrast these chaotic 
narratives with the quest and restitution narratives of other posters to the site, including its 
creator who conveys both a restitution conception of his treatment and the ethical imperative 
and sharing characteristic of a quest narrative: “I retell this story now because it’s time to wrap 
it up. It’s been six months since the procedure and everything is well. I can bathe and swim 
without an ear plug and my hearing is much better, although not perfect. Although recovery 
was painful and tedious at times, I regret nothing . . . .” Ricky Mondello, My Tympanoplasty, A 
Retrospective, RICKY MONDELLO: LIFE ENTHUSIAST (Aug. 23, 2008).” 
http://rmondello.com/2008/08/23/my-tympanoplasty-a-retrospective. 
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remedy in tort consistent with the rest of the law. I will then step 
back to consider how the expressive function of tort law, 
underplayed in civil recourse analysis, is compromised by the 
inconsistent treatment of victim subjectivity in constructing 
legal wrongs. 
1. Ignoring patient subjectivity is inconsistent with the definition of 
injury in related torts 
This Article began with the basic problem that tort theorists have 
generally clashed about whether tort law should be understood 
conceptually as law for allocating the costs of accidents or law about 
private “wrongs.”98 Over the last hundred years, the dominant view 
has been of tort law as a system for shifting losses to achieve policy 
objectives. In his well-known treatise, William L. Prosser concluded 
that the purpose of a tort action is to “compensate [the injured 
party] for the damage he has suffered, at the expense of the 
wrongdoer.”99 In the 1960s, as automobile use expanded, an 
increasing concern with car accidents entrenched this conception. 
Most great tort thinkers of the last half of the twentieth century 
adopted some version of it.100 Modern tort scholarship has seen the 
efforts by corrective justice theorists to apply principles of moral 
responsibility to the question of when a loss should be 
 
 98. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 918. 
 99. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 10 (1941). See 
also 4 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS, § 25.1 at 490, 493 (2d ed., 1986) 
(“The cardinal principle of damages in Anglo-American law is that of compensation for the 
injury caused to the plaintiff by the defendant’s breach of duty” through “repairing plaintiff’s 
injury or . . . making him whole as nearly as that may be done by an award of money”). 
Goldberg has explored the historical development of this notion of compensation as key to tort 
recovery and noted that, far from deriving from time immemorial, it was a departure from 
eighteenth and nineteenth understandings of tort claimants often being entitled to greater or 
lesser awards than required for perfect compensation. John C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of 
Tort Damages: Fair Versus Full Compensation, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 436–38 (2006). 
 100. See, e.g., FLEMING, supra note 1, at 1 (stating that “the economic cost of accidents 
represents a constant and mounting drain on the community’s human and material resources” 
and that the “task of the law of torts is to play an important regulatory role in the adjustment 
of these losses and the eventual allocation of their cost”); ATIYAH, supra note 1, at 239 
(describing tort law as primarily the rules governing compensation for “road accidents and 
industrial accidents”); CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 312 (1970) (arguing that the costs of 
accidents can be reduced by assigning them to the least cost avoider). 
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shifted.101Conversely, Judge Richard A. Posner has advanced an 
account of efficient-deterrence, in which the overarching project of 
tort is the most efficient use of resources overall.102 
Yet tort law is increasingly expanding into areas of wrongful 
injury that cannot be properly understood as loss compensation, 
including 10b-5 suits, civil RICO actions, workplace discrimination, 
constitutional torts, and intellectual property infringement.103 Civil 
recourse theorists John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky have 
challenged the loss allocative view of torts by advancing a model of 
tort law as a system of recourse for private wrongs.104 They identify 
four primary challenges to the notion of torts as wrongs, all of which 
help us better conceptualize the violation of informed consent as 
a tort.105 
First, in grappling with whether a tort should be understood as a 
moral or a legal wrong, Goldberg and Zipurksy note that while 
moral rules and legal rules are both, on their own terms, “duty 
imposing,” a legal rule does not have authority because it is morally 
sound but because it creates a legal directive.106 Although many torts 
are in fact moral wrongs, to claim that an action is a tort is not to 
claim that it has violated a moral duty but rather a legal duty.107 For 
example, a person who goes onto someone’s property while 
reasonably believing it to be his own, and commits no damage while 
he is there, cannot be said to have committed any moral wrong, but 
is nonetheless guilty of the legal wrong of trespass. Similarly, while a 
physician may be attempting to act morally, in accordance with his 
duty of beneficence, he may nonetheless violate an affirmative duty 
of disclosure and thereby commit a legal wrong against his patient. 
This is so regardless of the nature of the resulting physical effects. 
Second, in response to the argument that a tort cannot be a 
wrong if it is not formally “punished,” Goldberg and Zipursky assert 
that torts-as-wrongs are different from crimes insofar as they 
 
 101. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992); ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, 
EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW 48–58 (1999); Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of 
Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151–52 (1973). 
 102. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
TORT LAW 16–17(1987). 
 103. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 1, at 919. 
 104. See generally id. 
 105. Id. at 929–30. 
 106. Id. at 948–49. 
 107. Id. at 950. 
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represent violations of relational, rather than simple legal 
directives.108 Whereas a criminal prohibition states “For all x, x shall 
not A,” a tort occurs when someone violates the directive “For all x 
and for all y, x shall not do A to y.”109 While the criminal justice 
system exists to vindicate the wrongs of society for violations of the 
first type, “the tort system provides a system of civil recourse for 
victims against those who have committed relational wrongs against 
them.”110 The heightened relational component of an informed 
consent tort—based, as it is, upon the asymmetry in knowledge 
about the body as between the doctor and patient—shows how the 
wrong truly at issue should not be defined by the manner of physical 
injury resulting from it. 
Third, Goldberg and Zipursky acknowledge the seeming 
problem of “moral luck”—the fact that the same wrong conduct 
might result in injuries in some cases and not others.111 They resolve 
this problem by relying on the tort victim’s subjective experience of a 
wrong. “[F]rom the plaintiff’s perspective, it is not correct to say 
that there just happens to have been a conjunction of her loss and 
wrongful conduct by the defendant: In her eyes the defendant’s 
wrong is mistreating her or interfering with some aspect of her well-
being.”112 Embedded in the wrongs-based conception of tort, then, 
is the individual victim’s account of his harm—part of the definition 
of a wrong is that a victim perceives it as such. This subjective 
account matters less if we conceive of torts as the law of 
compensation, but becomes quite important to the wrongs-
based conception. 
Finally, in response to the criticism of torts as a “hodgepodge” of 
unrelated types of claims, Goldberg and Zipursky note that tort law 
can be understood to vindicate the interference with any of a 
number of interests, including those of bodily integrity and personal 
space.113 Again, the “interference” component of an informed 
consent violation has taken place at the moment the procedure has 
been performed, not the point at which a subsequent physical 
injury arises. 
 
 108. Id. at 945–46. 
 109. Id. at 945. 
 110. Id. at 946. 
 111. Id. at 942. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 941. 
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Nonetheless, the assumption of tort law—as distinct from 
criminal law—is that an injury must occur in order for a claim to 
lie.114 Due, in fact, to the relational quality of a tort wrong, a 
recognizable tort must also have a temporal component. Specifically, 
a plaintiff in a tort case must have what Zipursky calls “substantive 
standing;” inherent in the tort itself is the fact that the plaintiff must 
be the one injured by the defendant’s misconduct.115 As a result, the 
tort must also be “realized”—if the tort has only been attempted, a 
plaintiff cannot be injured and therefore have standing.116 (In 
contrast, the state can prosecute a criminal attempt without the 
requirement of a victim.) 
In the case of informed consent, it is, of course, fairly obvious 
that the patient is the party harmed by the physician’s breach of 
duty. The patient has clearly undergone some form of medical 
procedure he would not have wanted if he had had more knowledge. 
Indeed the relational component is heightened by virtue of the 
physician’s heightened duty to respect his patient’s autonomy 
through the affirmative requirements of providing information. In 
other words, while a layperson has a duty to take care not to injure 
another party, a physician has a duty to make specific disclosures to 
protect the patient’s autonomy. 
Yet the criterion of realization looks, at first blush, to cut against 
the recognition of a broader category of harm in these cases. The 
evidence from narrative medicine shows us that a patient’s lack of 
control over his illness narrative causes a range of physiological 
symptoms. However, due to the difficulty in measuring them in an 
individual case, when compared to a counterfactual in which the 
patient did not undergo the procedure, there appears to be an 
evidentiary bar to meeting the realization prong. 
Turning again to civil recourse theory, however, it becomes clear 
that these cases of informed consent have kinship to the particular, 
narrow category of so-called inchoate torts, which are well 
recognized in several contexts already. Take, for example, the “loss 
of chance” cases, in which the plaintiff can prove that he suffered 
harm but has evidentiary challenges in proving causation. The 
doctrine became recognized in suits brought by the survivors of 
 
 114. See Heidi M. Hurd, The Deontology of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. REV. 249, 262 (1996). 
 115. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Substantive Standing, Civil Recourse, and Corrective 
Justice, 39 FLA. ST. L. REV. 299, 304 (2011). 
 116. Id. 
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sailors lost at sea on ships with insufficient rescue devices.117 In such 
cases, it was impossible to show that, had the rescue devices been 
adequate, the sailors would in fact have been saved, but because 
courts recognized that the sailors had been injured by the inability to 
be saved at all, they allowed the cause of action.118 
This doctrine has spread more recently into the realm of 
malpractice to provide a remedy in cases where a physician 
negligently fails to diagnose a patient’s progressive disease until after 
the point at which there is any hope for a cure.119 In such cases, the 
physician’s duty has been reconceptualized from a duty to do no 
harm to a duty not to diminish a patient’s chance of survival.120 In 
recognizing these claims, however, courts have required that two 
criteria be met:121 First, that the plaintiffs have demonstrably suffered 
losses but have problems proving causation.122 And second, that the 
defendant has an existing affirmative duty to assist or protect, as 
opposed to merely refraining from injurious conduct.123 
Because a physician has an affirmative duty to provide enough 
information to respect a patient’s autonomy, the case of informed 
consent is analogous to these inchoate torts, and even stronger. If a 
physician has performed a procedure non-negligently, such that 
there are no obvious bad health outcomes from the procedure itself, 
it is pragmatically difficult for a plaintiff to prove that he would have 
forgone it. Thus, whatever long-term physiological effects 
accompany the overriding of his illness narrative, they are difficult to 
trace to the doctor’s withholding of information. And, of course, as 
in the lost chance context, the physician has an affirmative duty. The 
plaintiff is injured through the physician’s failure to respect his 
autonomy, and the limitation on the definition of injury in the 
current law is inconsistent with this understanding elsewhere. 
The lesson emerging from the foregoing discussion most 
applicable to informed consent is that in cases where a defendant has 
 
 117. See Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 75–
77 (1956). 
 118. Id. 
 119. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 178 at 434–35 (2000). 
 120. Id. 
 121. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 
1625, 1657–58 (2002). 
  122.  Id. 
 123. Id. 
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clearly breached a heightened duty to a plaintiff, who nonetheless 
has difficulty proving a chain of causation, the law will recognize an 
“inchoate” tort as a formal legal wrong for the purposes of providing 
redress. In these informed consent cases it is indisputable that a 
subjective wrong has occurred; allowing redress for it without 
requiring an explicit connection to its physiological pathway would 
be most consistent with the current treatment of the most closely 
related torts. 
2. Ignoring subjectivity undermines the legitimacy of the tort system 
Thus far this article has been limited to discussion of the physical 
harm suffered by an individual patient as a result of a physician 
overriding the patient’s subjective preferences, and the nature of the 
legal wrong that should arise from it. Civil recourse theory has aided 
us here; but, in its focus on the nature of the wrong suffered by an 
individual, the theory gives shorter shrift to how the outwardly 
expressive function of the law itself validates individual subjectivity in 
a way that cannot be discounted. The theory of relational autonomy 
suggests that the individual exercise of medical decision-making may 
be inflected and shaped by external forces and one of those is the law 
itself, in its recognition of personhood.124 In this section I will 
examine the ways through which our existing legal systems for 
vindicating wrong serve expressive functions and the ways in which 
those functions derive legitimacy from the recognition and validation 
of victims’ subjective harm. 
It is more common, and perhaps more obviously justified, to talk 
about the expressive function of criminal law, rather than tort. Yet 
the characteristics of tort law identified by civil recourse theory 
suggest the ways in which tort itself, both descriptively and through 
its implications, normatively, serves an expressive function as well. 
We have seen how a tort can be theorized as a wrong without the 
requirement of the sort of moral component we frequently demand 
from the criminal law. But in the very articulation of a form of 
wrong—and the corresponding creation and protection of a right—
the law expresses a value judgment, even if that judgment is simply as 
to the scope of the rights it protects. One can, in other words, be a 
“wrong-doer” or a “wronged” party simply because the law says so. 
There is no need to carve out another space for “expressive” 
 
 124. See NEDELSKY, supra note 37, at 65. 
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dignitary torts; some degree of expression is inherent in the 
whole project. 
Tort law, like criminal law, makes statements—be they universal 
or individuated—about prohibitions, and the relationship between 
those statements and social norms is as mutually reinforcing in the 
torts context as it is in the criminal.125 Specifically, tort law identifies 
prohibited interferences, defining which sort of interferences count 
as actionable wrongs, and in so doing impacts individuals’ 
experiences of ownership over their bodies. The limits on bodily 
interference turn out to depend in part upon what the law has to say 
about personhood, which is one of the most important expressive 
products of tort. I hope to show that part of what is at stake in these 
informed consent cases, and what matters for tort law more 
generally, is the relationship between the subjective personhoods of 
the tortfeasor and victim at the moment the former has improperly 
overborn the latter. 
The precise legal definition of personhood is notoriously 
slippery.126 It is nonetheless assumed, even in constitutional dictates, 
as a precondition for legal protection.127 The question of whether 
the word person is simply interchangeable with human has galvanized 
a great deal of debate across a number of disciplines. As the Supreme 
Court decided in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad 
Co., non-corporeal entities may be considered legal “persons.”128 
Proponents of legal protections for animals make the case that they 
should qualify for legal personhood.129 Fundamentally, the 
 
 125. For comprehensive treatment of the expressive functions of the law see Elizabeth S. 
Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1503, 1504 (2000); Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 
IOWA L. REV. 35, 40 (2002). 
 126. Margaret Radin provides a summary of four philosophical theories of the person: (1) 
the Kantian view of the “person as rights-holder” or a “free and rational being whose existence 
is an end in itself,” (2) the Lockean view of the person as a being with self-consciousness and 
memory, (3) the view of the person as a being with bodily continuity, and (4) the view of a 
person as possessing a past and a future integrated by a character. MARGARET JANE RADIN, 
REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 39 (1993). 
 127. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . .”) 
(emphasis added); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“. . . nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 128. 118 U.S. 394 (1886). 
 129. See, e.g., Gary Francione, Animal Rights Theory and Utilitarianism: Relative 
Normal Guidance, 3 ANIMAL L. 75, 83–86 (1997). 
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“discrepancies in the way in which different people define 
personhood reveal that there is no widely agreed upon set of criteria 
that must be satisfied in order for a being to qualify as a person[,]” 
and, indeed, even the disagreement as to whether humanhood is a 
prerequisite means that there is “no necessary conceptual connection 
between the terms ‘human’ and ‘person.’”130 
Because the concept of personhood is unsettled, the law serves 
an expressive function in merely categorizing individuals and entities 
as being entitled to it. The law also has the capacity to identify 
certain qualities of the individual as most important to personhood 
through the interests it recognizes and protects. In private law, 
scholars have utilized the “personhood theory of property” to 
explain the seeming hierarchy in property interests the law 
recognizes under certain circumstances.131 Scholars have debated, for 
example, whether “personal” property is treated as more sacrosanct 
than “fungible” property due to the subjective nature of the 
relationship between person and thing, with the former category 
closer to an extension of personhood than the latter.132 By giving 
certain property interests objectively greater protection than others, 
the private law inherently privileges a particular account of the 
subjective relationship between an individual and his possessions.133 
For example, Margaret Radin describes a continuum of “property-as-
personhood” to explain the First Amendment cases concerning 
 
 130. Luis E. Chiesa, Of Persons and the Criminal Law: (Second Tier) Personhood as a 
Prerequisite for Victimhood, 28 PACE L. REV. 759, 765–66 (2008). Chiesa proposes four 
“tiers” of personhood, allowing various degrees of legal protection corresponding to the 
relative sentience of the entities in question. Id. at 773–78. 
 131. RADIN, supra note 126, at 2–3. See also Jane B. Baron, Intention, Interpretation, 
and Stories, 42 DUKE L.J. 630, 676 (1992); D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255, 257 (2006); Jeremy Blumenthal, “To Be Human”: A Psychological 
Perspective on Property Law, 83 TUL. L. REV. 609 (2009); Mary L. Clark, Reconstructing the 
World Trade Center: An Argument for the Applicability of Personhood Theory to Commercial 
Property Ownership and Use, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 815, 815–16 (2005); Cheryl I. Harris, 
Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1725 (1993); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. 
Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1849, 1858 (2007); Michael S. 
Moore, Four Reflections on Law and Morality, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1523, 1563 (2007). 
But see Jeffrey Douglas Jones, Property and Personhood Revisited, 1 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 
93 (2011). 
 132. RADIN, supra note 126, at 53. 
 133. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, 
Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 37, 41–42 (1990) (positing the 
role of post hoc narrative explanations in justifying the utility-maximizing preference ordering 
associated with the classical Lockean theory of property). 
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speech rights on the commercial property of others.134 In PruneYard 
Shopping Center v. Robins, the Supreme Court upheld, against a 
Takings Clause challenge, a state supreme court recognition of 
protestors’ state constitutional speech rights in a private commercial 
shopping center.135 Radin suggests that “[s]hopping center property 
is not likely to be bound up with the personhood of the shopping 
center owner, while public speech, especially if considered political, is 
likely to be tied to the personhood of the speaker.”136 If Radin’s 
distinction here is correct, the difference between commercial 
property and exercise of speech turns, at least in part, upon the 
fungibility of the former relative to the highly subjective, expressive 
value of the latter. 
This Article is, of course, concerned with the aspects of 
personhood implicated by an individual’s control over his or her own 
body, which has a long tradition amongst the most basic of rights 
protected by a legal order.137 The numerous philosophical critiques 
of Cartesian dualism have created a starting point for this discussion 
through the basic insight that, though not identical, the 
consciousness and the body are dialectically interrelated, a 
phenomenon we have seen empirically in the patient context I 
described earlier.138 Most relevant from a legal standpoint, the body 
can be characterized as “the conscious vulnerability of self in the 
world, the felt capacity to be affected, injured.”139 (It is presumably 
this vulnerability that is recognized, for example, through the tort of 
assault as distinct from battery; the former allows recovery for the 
apprehension of intentional bodily harm without the requirement 
that a touching actually occur.) Health ethicist Sally Gadow explains 
that mastery of the body-self is necessary to an individual’s 
achievement of well-being through unity.140 Illness and aging result 
 
 134. Radin, supra note 126, at 68. 
 135. 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
 136. RADIN, supra note 126, at 68. 
 137. Locke’s famous justification for property rights begins with the assumption that 
“every man has a Property in his own Person.” JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF 
GOVERNMENT, Ch. V, § 27 (1698), reprinted in JOHN LOCKE: TWO TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT 328 (P. Laslett ed., 1960). 
 138. Sally Gadow, Body and Self: A Dialectic, 5 J. MED. & PHIL. 172 (1980). For a range 
of contemporary philosophical perspectives on the subject, see THE BODY AND THE SELF (José 
Luis Bermúdez, Anthony Marcel & Naomi Eilan eds., 1995). 
 139. Gadow, supra note 138, at 174. 
 140. Id. at 179. 
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in a breakdown in the body-self unity, which is generally resolved 
through disengagement—negating the body’s “‘mineness’ in 
emotional and perceptual terms.”141 
A detailed discussion of the considerable philosophical 
scholarship on the nature of the self is beyond the scope of this 
paper. Nonetheless, I take it as a starting point that (a) the 
protection from harm of the physical body is a feature of both our 
criminal and tort law systems and (b) “personhood”—whatever its 
precise contours—is the expressive concept through which our 
system declares that legal rights exist. It therefore becomes apparent 
how the physical harms I earlier demonstrated as arising from a 
tortfeasor’s interference with an individual’s sense of self should be 
accounted for in the concept of personhood animating both our 
criminal and tort systems. 
The criminal law deploys narratives about blameworthiness and 
condemnation into the culture at large, which potentially legitimate, 
challenge, or shape the existing norms about these subjects. And 
individual crime victims have their own subjective narratives about 
the criminal harm they have suffered, which will circulate through 
their societies and collectively contribute to a broader collective 
experience of criminality. This societal experience is part of the 
“public wrong” redressed by the criminal law, and will shape norms 
about culpability in ways to which the formal law should 
be responsive. 
In the case of a tort claim, of course, there is no “public wrong” 
to be redressed. Nonetheless, if we understand tort as a law of 
wrongs we can see how the tort system—in defining what constitutes 
a wrong and providing a forum for its redress—serves its own 
expressive function. Here, however, the primary questions about 
which the law provides an answer are what sorts of harms qualify for 
redress, and to what extent? A victim’s narrative about the harm he 
has suffered is less relevant here as part of a larger, public account of 
harm which requires its own vindication. Given the plainly narrative-
generating capacity of the tort law, however, to what extent should 
individuals’ narrative accounts of their harm be relevant to the 
question of what constitutes a “private wrong”? Again, the 
comparison to the criminal law provides some clarity. 
 
 141. Id. 
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In his work on the role of crime victims in the war on crime, 
Markus Dirk Dubber argues for a personhood-focused 
understanding of criminal law, which casts light on the relationship 
between personhood and legal wrong and its redress.142 For Dubber, 
one of the problems with the so-called war on crime is that it has 
turned criminal justice into a matter between criminal threats and the 
state, with an objective—served in part through the disproportionate 
prosecution of “victimless” crimes such as possession—primarily to 
eradicate threats against the state rather than individuals.143 In this 
context, he argues, the victims-rights movement is problematic as it 
transforms individuals into generic “victims,” who are then used to 
justify the eradication of threats against the state.144 In this view, the 
essence of a possession offense is “that it amounts to disobedience to 
a state authority,” which makes the state itself the victim.145 Yet 
when actual victims become used as symbols to justify authoritarian 
power, they become twice victimized—by the perpetrator and the 
state itself, which, as Dubber points out, views itself as the 
real victim.146 
While Dubber’s argument as applied to crime victims proves too 
much,147 it rests in part on an understanding of the relationship 
between the criminal law and the individual. This in turn sheds light 
on the role of an individual’s subjective experience in any legal 
account of harm. Dubber claims that the primary aim of the criminal 
law should be the protection of the autonomy of individuals, and 
that we should therefore refocus ourselves on crimes where a victim’s 
 
 142. MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME: THE USE AND ABUSE OF 
VICTIMS’ RIGHTS (2002). 
 143. Id. at 32–97. 
 144. Id. at 335. 
 145. Id. at 96. 
 146. Id. at 193. 
 147. Dubber may well be correct that the interests of individual victims may be 
jeopardized through their deployment as symbols for the state, but the conclusions he draws 
from it (including the inappropriateness of victim impact statements in a sentencing 
proceeding), are overreaching. Indeed, the inclusion of actual victim narratives in trials with 
actual victims should only serve to throw into relief the victimless nature of other sorts of 
crimes. It is difficult to imagine how removal of victim narratives from the former class of cases 
can do anything to resolve the problem of the state substituting its own victimization for that 
of the legitimate victim. As I have argued elsewhere, individual victim stories belong in the 
courtroom precisely because they also circulate through society and become therefore part of 
the public harm ostensibly vindicated by the criminal justice system. Erin Sheley, Reverberations 
of the Victim’s “Voice”: Victim Impact Statements and the Cultural Project of Punishment, 87 
IND. L.J. 1247, 1281–85 (2012). 
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autonomy has been overridden by an offender.148 Dubber argues, in 
particular, for victim compensation as a possible remedy in such 
cases.149 For Dubber, personhood connects the law of compensation 
with criminal punishment.150 Such a relationship, he argues, would 
treat both the offender and the victim as persons, excluding the state 
as a victim and focusing on the wrong done by one individual to 
another.151 Whether or not this is an adequate description of the 
purpose and function of criminal justice, it does show how attention 
to the precise identities of the individuals involved in a wrongful act 
can rescript the broader stories the law is able to tell about its 
vindication of wrong. In particular it illustrates how the act of legal 
recourse animates the relationship between two personhoods—one 
impinged by the other—and posits that the acknowledgment of this 
relationship can play a substantive role in a vindication of 
the impingement. 
Taking this relationship seriously should, as I have argued, cause 
us to look more closely at the physical harm flowing from the 
disruption of a patient’s illness narrative through an inappropriate 
assertion of will on the part of his doctor. But it should also remind 
us that in choosing to limit the legally relevant definition of 
personhood by excluding certain injuries to the self from civil 
recourse, the law makes a statement about personhood itself. Such 
statements, if too far removed from shared notions of justice, run the 
risk of undermining the legitimacy of the legal order altogether. 
C. The Negligence Standard Distorts the Doctor-Patient Relationship 
Understanding the third problem with the existing definition of 
injury requires a return to the first prong of the negligence standard: 
the measure of the physician’s duty to provide information. In half of 
the jurisdictions, remember, the extent of a physician’s duty to 
provide information is measured by the practices of other physicians 
in the relevant medical community. In jurisdictions applying the 
“reasonable patient” standard, the test becomes what information a 
reasonable patient would have wanted to know. In this section I will 
argue that both of these standards are illogical and fail to encourage 
 
 148. DUBBER, supra note 142, at 210–11. 
 149. Id. at 243–44. 
 150. Id. at 237. 
 151. Id. at 237–40. 
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the physician to disclose the subjectively desirable amount of 
information. Due to the interplay between incoherent standards of 
duty and the limited definition of injury, the negligence test distorts 
the economy of knowledge and power in the doctor-
patient relationship. 
1. The “physician-based” standard 
Because the physician-based standard has already been the 
subject of a great deal of scholarly criticism, I will not spend much 
time on it here. The most common objection to using the medical 
community to determine the appropriate amount of information a 
patient should receive is that doctors as a group may have 
occupational commitments that do not necessarily track with 
patients’ actual interests.152 In other words, doctors have expertise in 
diagnosing and treating diseases, not in deciding what a private 
individual deems relevant to making a highly personal decision. 
Furthermore, the patterns of medical practice across the United 
States have been found to be remarkably varied, in part through a 
general failure to involve patients in choice of treatments that 
depend upon patient preference.153 Therefore, allowing the medical 
community to be arbiters of consent runs the risk of depriving 
patients of the very autonomy the concept is supposed to protect. 
2. The “reasonable patient” standard 
Despite the apparent relocation of authority from practitioner to 
patient embodied in the “reasonable patient” standard, it too has a 
number of problems. In tort law generally, the “reasonable man,” or 
“reasonable person,” standard has become the template for 
determining negligence.154 The reasonable person is expected to 
“know the statutory and common law, in so far as it establishes a 
standard of obligatory behaviour, at the risk of incurring liability if 
 
 152. See generally KATZ, supra note 44; Morris, supra note 59, at 329. 
 153. John E. Wennberg & Philip G. Peters, Jr., Unwarranted Variations in the Quality of 
Health Care: Can the Law Help Medicine Provide a Remedy/Remedies?, 37 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 925, 937 (2002). 
 154. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§§ 282–83 (1965) (defining negligent conduct 
as that “which falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others against 
unreasonable risk of harm,” which standard is described as the behavior of “a reasonable man 
under like circumstances”). 
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he falls below it.”155 This formulation fits into the loss-allocative 
conception of tort, and indeed the Restatement incorporates risk-
utility analysis into the judgment of the reasonable person (in the 
absence of an explicit statutory command): to determine the risk of 
his action an actor must consider “the extent of the chance” that his 
conduct will cause harm, “the extent of the harm likely to be caused 
to the interests imperiled,” and “the number of persons” exposed to 
harm, in addition to “the social value which the law attaches to the 
interests which are imperiled.”156 On the side of utility, the actor 
must consider “the extent of the chance” that his interest will be 
advanced by his conduct, the “extent of the chance that such interest 
can be adequately advanced or protected by another and less 
dangerous course of conduct,” and “the social value which the law 
attaches to the interest which is to be advanced or protected by 
the conduct.”157 
Victim conduct is also evaluated according to risk-benefit analysis 
in allocating costs between injurer and victim. The valuation of an 
objective standard of care will depend upon such factors as: 
(1) differences in the ability to take care among injurers and among 
victims; (2) whether the injurer or victim should have been 
engaging in the activity; (3) whether the injurer or victim’s ability 
to take care could have been efficiently improved by earlier acts; (4) 
whether the injurer or victim’s optimal level of care is materially 
affected by the other’s optimal level of care; and (5) whether the 
benefits of engaging in the activity for either injurers or victims are 
difficult to determine and vary substantially among victims 
or injurers.158 
Scholarship on liability rules in tort has sought to maximize 
social welfare by inducing injurers and victims to replicate the mix of 
care and activities for which they would have bargained in the 
absence of transaction costs.159 
In other words, in traditional negligence regimes we think of a 
potential injurer and potential victim as having reciprocal duties 
 
 155. Id. § 290 cmt. n. 
 156. Id. § 293. 
 157. Id. § 292. 
 158. Warren F. Schwartz, Objective and Subjective Standards of Negligence: Defining the 
Reasonable Person to Induce Optimal Care and Optimal Populations of Injurers and Victims, 78 
GEO. L.J. 241, 245 (1989). 
 159. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 179–97 (1998). 
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toward one another to avoid a loss.160 In evaluating a pedestrian’s 
tort suit against a driver in any kind of comparative or contributory 
negligence regime, for example, a jury will have to determine how 
much care a “reasonable” pedestrian ought to be exercising to avoid 
an injury upon encountering a negligent driver. If we try to fit the 
doctor and patient into the roles of injurer and victim of negligence 
in an informed consent case, we run into problems of logic. To avoid 
the pedestrian’s injury through car accident, a driver has a duty to 
exercise care in driving and a pedestrian in walking. To avoid the 
patient’s injury through a nonconsensual procedure the physician has 
a duty to exercise care in providing information and a patient 
in . . . what? 
The difficulty is that the interrelated allocation of duties between 
injurers and victims with regard to which the “reasonableness” of a 
“reasonable” victim is calculated cannot be applied in a coherent 
fashion to our understanding of a “reasonable patient.” Unlike the 
victim in other negligence settings, the patient has no affirmative 
duty of care, no duty to ask for information from his doctor.161 The 
doctor, in effect, serves as a gatekeeper to information in which a 
patient is assumed to be unversed. As the D.C. Circuit noted in one 
of the landmark modern cases on informed consent, the duty to 
volunteer information in the face of silence belongs to the physician 
because “[c]aveat emptor is not the norm for the consumer of 
medical services.”162 Furthermore, and again unlike the reasonable 
person in other areas of tort, the patient has no obligation to make a 
reasonable decision in terms of treatment itself, but is free to accept 
or reject it for any idiosyncratic reason he chooses.163 This reflects 
the origins of informed consent law in battery: actual physical harm 
was not relevant as battery is a dignitary tort; therefore efforts to 
measure the costs, absorbed or imposed, by potential victims make 
little sense. As Grant Morris notes, “by not obligating physicians to 
ask their patients what their concerns are, and then to respond to 
these concerns, the [D.C. Circuit], in reality, ruled that the 
 
 160. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 
60 (1972). 
 161. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 162. Id. 
 163. See id.at 790 (“To be sure, the objective of risk-disclosure is preservation of the 
patient’s interest in intelligent self-choice on proposed treatment, a matter the patient is free to 
decide for any reason that appeals to him.”). 
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physician’s disclosure duty is owed, not to his or her patient, but 
only to the reasonable patient.”164 
So what work, then, is the “reasonable patient” doing in a jury’s 
determination of negligence? It would seem that the physician’s 
liability is limited to the extent that a patient becomes unreasonable. 
That is, a patient whose consent would have required an 
“unreasonable” amount of information should have to bear the costs 
of whatever injury flows from this lack of additional knowledge. But 
what does it mean to be “reasonable” in a desire for information? In 
actuality, the foundation for liability for negligence has been 
described as knowledge, or its legal equivalent: “opportunity 
through reasonable diligence to acquire knowledge.”165 Liability 
turns on the foreseeability of harm, and the foreseeability of harm 
must depend on knowledge.166 Indeed, a reasonable man aware of 
his own ignorance as to some fact may be required to take 
“precautions against possible but unknown danger.”167 It is precisely 
because of a physician’s asymmetrical access to relevant information 
that the law does not allocate any of the physician’s duty to disclose 
to the patient. Yet if that is the case, on what basis do we interject an 
objective “reasonable patient,” whose reasonableness turns on the 
assumption of possessing knowledge, into the question of whether a 
particular patient was provided with adequate knowledge in a 
given case? 
But perhaps the reasonable person of tort is the improper model 
for our reasonable patient. In cases of informed consent we are, after 
all, dealing with a contract-like agreement. Indeed, the Mohr court 
characterized it just so, stating “[i]f the physician advises his patient 
to submit to a particular operation, and the patient weighs the 
dangers and risks incident to its performance, and finally consents, he 
thereby, in effect, enters into a contract authorizing his physician to 
operate to the extent of the consent given, but no further.”168 
Reasonable persons differ as between tort and contract law. The 
reasonable person of tort “is a more universalized personage, 
 
 164. Morris, supra note 59, at 329. 
 165. People ex rel. Price v. Sheffield Farms-Slawson-Decker Co., 121 N.E. 474, 476 
(N.Y. 1918). 
 166. Fleming James, Jr., The Qualities of the Reasonable Man in Negligence Cases, 16 MO. 
L. REV. 1, 5 (1951). 
 167. Id. at 6. 
 168. Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 15 (Minn. 1905). 
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reflective of the general duties of care owed to fellow human 
beings,” while the reasonable person of contract “is a more 
specialized creature, possessing all of the idiosyncratic features of the 
contracting parties viewed within the context of their 
interaction[,] . . . [and] is more concerned with what people actually 
do in a specific marketplace.”169 In contract, even under the 
objective theory, in which the “reasonable person” serves as an 
independent interpreter of the expressions of contract, it has been 
noted that “a contract shall have the meaning that a reasonable 
person would give it under the circumstances under which it was 
made, if he knew everything he should plus everything the parties 
actually knew.”170 The “reasonable person” of contract is thus the 
interpreter used to determine liability flowing from consent; liability 
is, in these cases, premised on an assumption of knowledge. Again, 
an attempt to import the doctor and patient into the roles of 
contracting parties becomes complicated. If we say that the 
agreement to perform a procedure is a contract and the disputed 
term in an informed consent case is the scope of authority yielded to 
the doctor, the question should be what a reasonable person in the 
patient’s position would have understood the degree of authority to 
be if he knew everything he should. But in cases of failure to obtain 
informed consent, the question of authority itself turns on the 
adequacy of information provided by the doctor. 
These examples from tort and contract demonstrate the difficulty 
in using an objective standard to determine the adequate amount of 
information required by a patient in a situation in which the doctor 
effectively serves as the gatekeeper to knowledge. The concept of 
“reasonableness” is generally deployed in the first place to hold 
actors responsible for obtaining knowledge. In an informed consent 
case, the analysis assumes the existence of “unknown unknowns”—in 
other words, the fact that there was information about treatment 
which no patient would have been expected to know—and asks the 
ex post question of whether a reasonable person would have wanted 
to know it in order to make a treatment decision. Yet, because the 
law purports to recognize a patient’s right to exercise authority over 
his own bodily integrity, a patient has no reciprocal duty of care in 
 
 169. Larry A. DiMatteo, The Counterpoise of Contracts: The Reasonable Person Standard 
and the Subjectivity of Judgment, 48 S.C. L. REV. 293, 317–18 (1997). 
 170. W. David Slawson, The Futile Search for Principles for Default Rules, 3 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 29, 38 (1993) (emphasis added). 
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making those treatment decisions in a particular way. The 
“reasonable patient,” then, is an incoherent arbiter of the value truly 
protected by the doctrine of informed consent: the physician’s duty 
to provide information to which only he or she has access for a 
patient to use to his or her own idiosyncratic ends in making 
decisions about the disposition of his or her body. 
Despite these theoretical difficulties presented by the objective 
standard, there are obviously very good reasons to protect a 
physician from the potentially limitless idiosyncrasies that could 
motivate different patients to desire unpredictably differing amounts 
of information (remembering too, of course, that some patients 
might prefer not to be told of sufficiently remote risks, or be 
presented with so much information as to render them confused).171 
Furthermore, a purely subjective test might allow patients bitter over 
a bad medical outcome to allege lack of consent by falsely testifying 
that they would have made a different decision from the one they 
made had they had additional information.172 And, as courts have 
noted, a subjective standard might prevent a patient’s next of kin 
from recovering in cases where the patient dies as a result of the 
procedure.173 Though Oregon and Oklahoma have experimented 
with versions of a subjective standard, courts have limited it in 
practice and it remains an anomaly.174 
IV. A NEW PROPOSAL 
Having shown how the shortcomings of the current definition of 
injury under informed consent result from a higher-level theoretical 
debate, I will now propose a specific doctrinal fix. 
A. Liability Standard 
Because the interaction between illness, medical care, and the 
stories patients tell to navigate the two have such significant effects 
on overall health, the account of harm recognized by informed 
 
 171. See, e.g., Ashe v. Radiation Oncology Assocs., 9 S.W.3d 119, 122 (Tenn. 1999). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. King & Moulton, supra note 18, at 444–45. Some scholars of law and medicine 
have also advanced proposals for new systems of “shared decision-making,” which would 
involve patient and doctor in a dialogue intended to illuminate a patient’s subjective 
informational needs ahead of time. Id. 
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consent law should not ignore the importance of subjective 
experience in deciding when a physician should determine and defer 
to a patient’s actual preferences for treatment. Nonetheless, when 
the law defines a legal wrong it negotiates two distinct personhoods. 
A physician’s personhood is also implicated in the doctor-patient 
relationship, in his various competing duties as a doctor, and 
through his interest in practicing medicine in the way that reflects his 
own values and judgment. A more nuanced attention to the legal 
account of harm would afford the patient’s personhood greater 
protection while retaining some of the protections to the doctor’s 
available under the current regime. 
As noted in Part III.C, supra, some scholars have argued for an 
abolishment of both the physician-centered and “reasonable patient” 
standards of duty in favor of a purely subjective, patient-based 
standard. However, a proper understanding of the nature of the 
uninformed patient’s injury urges a third, superior way. Under the 
current negligence test for informed consent claims, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate, remember, three elements: (1) the physician’s breach 
of duty to provide information (measured by either the physician-
centered or reasonable patient standard); (2) that the patient would 
have forgone the recommended treatment had he or she known that 
information; and (3) the existence of an injury as a result. In lieu of 
changing the first prong to a purely subjective standard, a more 
nuanced understanding of the “injury” suffered by any patient who 
undergoes a procedure in the absence of consent will allow us to 
productively consider the relationship between the second and third 
prongs of this test. 
In other words, in cases where it can be shown at the second 
prong of the current negligence standard that a patient would in fact 
have forgone a particular recommended treatment if he had been in 
possession of all relevant information, then he is entitled to a 
rebuttable presumption that he has suffered an injury—without 
having to show a particular physical harm. This standard has the 
obvious benefit of recognizing that physicians inflict very real 
physical harms by interfering with patient illness narratives through 
undesired treatment. It likewise has the benefit of administrability. 
The question of causation—i.e., whether the patient would have 
forgone treatment with adequate information—is already one that 
must be answered under the current regime, and has been a bar to 
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claims where no such showing could be made.175 Furthermore, the 
collapsing of the third prong into the second prong would not entail 
the same degree of ex ante guesswork on the part of the physician 
that would result from the substitution of a purely subjective 
standard at prong one. Under the proposed regime, a physician’s 
duty would still be limited by a jury’s determination, under one 
objective standard or another, of what constituted adequate 
disclosure, without reference to the potential idiosyncrasies of a 
particular patient. However, if by such a standard it can be 
determined that a physician breached his duty and that such a breach 
led to the overbearing of a patient’s personhood through the 
imposition of an otherwise unwanted procedure, a patient should be 
presumed to have been injured. 
B. Remedial Rules 
In the previous sections I have endeavored to show that, due to 
the relationship between knowledge, autonomy, and patient 
narrative on the one hand, and physiological well-being on the 
other, a cognizable injury occurs when a patient can show that he 
would have forgone a particular treatment in the absence of full 
information from his physician. I have also shown that failure to 
recognize the general integration of the expressive aspect of an injury 
with a victim’s experience of the injury has led to an unresolved 
debate about the appropriate role of “punitive” considerations in 
recognizing tort injuries. This debate is made more troubling by the 
lessons on systemic legitimacy we can take from the situation of the 
victim in the criminal justice system. The most obvious objection at 
this juncture is that, even if we accept these contentions to be true, 
the impossibility of calculating actual damages in the absence of a 
measurable physical injury should preclude recovery. 
The tort law, of course, already allows juries to make awards 
based upon a victim’s pain and suffering attendant to a physical 
harm; rather than requiring clear economic valuations for such harm, 
jurors are allowed to assess damages through recourse to their 
“collective enlightened conscience.”176 Furthermore, the tort of 
 
 175. See, e.g., Fain v. Smith, 479 So. 2d 1150 (Ala. 1985); Wilson v. Merritt, 48 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 630 (Ct. App. 2006); Funke v. Fieldman, 512 P.2d 539 (Kan. 1973); Matthies v. 
Mastromonaco, 709 A.2d 238 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998); Bubb v. Brusky, 768 N.W.2d 
903 (Wis. 2009). 
 176. E.g., RONALD W. EADES, JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS 
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intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) requires that juries 
determine whether a defendant’s conduct rose to the level of 
“extreme and outrageous,” without precise guidance as to the 
meaning of the words.177 Yet damages for pain and suffering—as well 
as for negligent infliction of emotional distress, which can be 
recovered with a lower showing of culpability than that required for 
IIED—are generally only recoverable pendent to a showing of 
concrete physical harm.178 Indeed, in the medical malpractice context 
generally, the mere existence of a “pain and suffering” component to 
a jury award for a negligently inflicted injury has drawn a particularly 
large amount of criticism.179 These critiques flow in part from the 
conception of the primary goals of tort law as deterrence and 
compensation (or “insurance”).180 
Law and economics scholars have suggested that pain and 
suffering damages are unnecessary to achieve deterrence because 
customers know the quality of the goods at issue and damages 
therefore serve mainly to insure against injuries.181 Because people 
facing a risk of injury or death will insure against economic, but not 
noneconomic, losses, the argument goes, the justification for 
compensating noneconomic losses is weak.182 The counterargument 
 
321 (3d ed. 1993) (“There are no objective guidelines by which you can measure the money 
equivalent of this element of injury; the only real measuring stick, if it can be so described, is 
your collective enlightened conscience. You should consider all the evidence bearing on the 
nature of the injuries, the certainty of future pain, the severity and the likely duration thereof. 
In this difficult task of putting a money figure on an aspect of injury that does not readily lend 
itself to an evaluation in terms of money, you should try to be as objective, calm and 
dispassionate as the situation will permit, and not to be unduly swayed by considerations 
of sympathy.”). 
 177. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965). 
 178. See, e.g., 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1702 (2004) (defining “serious injury” as “[a] 
personal injury resulting in death, serious impairment of body function or permanent serious 
disfigurement”); Brooks v. Odom, 696 A.2d 619, 623–24 (N.J. 1997) (holding that for a 
plaintiff to recover for pain and suffering under the Tort Claims Act, he must sustain a 
substantial “permanent loss of a bodily function” (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:9-
2(d) (2000)). 
 179. Neil Vidmar, Pap and Circumstance: What Jury Verdict Statistics Can Tell Us About 
Jury Behavior and the Tort System, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1205, 1224 (1994); NEIL VIDMAR, 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING THE MYTHS ABOUT JURY 
INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS, AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS 7 (1995). 
 180. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice 
Damages Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 399–400 (2005). 
 181. See id. at 400. 
 182. Id. (citing George L. Priest, Can Absolute Manufacturer Liability Be Defended?, 9 
YALE J. ON REG. 237, 252 (1992); Richard A. Epstein, The Legal and Insurance Dynamics of 
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to this view is the position that, due to patients’ lack of knowledge of 
the true quality of goods at the time of contracting, and to the 
investment in quality that takes place after the initial contract 
formation, noneconomic damages do have some deterrent value.183 
Yet if this is the case, it presents problems for assessing the degree of 
damages to be awarded, due to the principle of economic theory 
suggesting that it is not optimal to compensate victims fully for 
noneconomic losses in contexts where compensation functions 
partially as insurance, because victims necessarily pay for this up front 
in terms of higher prices.184 
Ellen Smith Pryor has critiqued the entire insurance conception 
of compensation in medical malpractice cases due in part to its 
inability to account for the highly subjective valuations of money, 
loss, and quality of life held by the disabled.185 In particular, she 
notes that the theoretical division of losses into generally-
compensable “pecuniary” losses and “nonpecuniary” losses, which 
some theorists argue should only be compensable if they increase the 
marginal utility of money, “requires both the owner’s subjective 
judgment about whether an equivalent commodity is available for 
particular aspects of various losses and the owner’s subjective 
valuation of the loss.”186 And so, for example, one disabled patient 
might find a handicapped bicycle to be an acceptable substitute for 
the cycling he had done prior to his injury, whereas another might 
find it an unacceptable substitute for running. The “nonpecuniary” 
component of the losses experienced by each would therefore be 
different. If Pryor is correct, then drawing the line between the two 
types of losses in a particular way expresses an able person’s narrative 
of how the effects of bodily harm and incapacitation should 
be valued. 
In any case, as I have attempted to show in Part III, the nature 
of the physical harm flowing from an unwanted medical procedure 
 
Mass Tort Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 475, 490–91, 506 (1984); Alan Schwartz, Proposals 
for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 408 (1988)). 
 183. Id. at 401 (citing Jennifer Arlen & W. Bentley MacLeod, Malpractice Liability for 
Physicians and Managed Care Organizations, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1929, 1979 (2003)). 
 184. Id. at 402. 
 185. Ellen Smith Pryor, The Tort Law Debate, Efficiency, and the Kingdom of the Ill: A 
Critique of the Insurance Theory of Compensation, 79 VA. L. REV 91, 97 (1993). 
 186. Id. at 101–04, 130–31. Pryor makes the point that, due to the variability of 
subjective judgments about replaceability and valuation, the insurance theory’s purported 
reliance on subjective judgments is particularly unattractive. Id. at 135. 
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may be less obvious than the related losses—pecuniary or not—that 
generally form the basis for pain and suffering awards. Therefore, 
even if it is true that aggregated data of the sort I discussed above 
strongly suggest that some sort of physical harm occurs in these cases, 
the challenge of calculating it in an individual instance seems 
formidable enough to urge against what might seem to be a 
specious—and easily abused—attempt. This argument is even 
stronger when coupled with a physician’s inherent duty of 
beneficence, a duty it would be pragmatically undesirable to chill and 
which implicates the physician’s own legal personhood as embodied 
in his right to exercise the professional judgment with which he has 
been entrusted in a manner consistent with his own conscience. 
Let us return, for example, to the case of the Mohr plaintiff, but 
imagine that her surgery had gone rather differently. Let us imagine 
that, as the record suggests, she was terrified of the prospect of 
surgery even on the agreed-upon ear. Let us also imagine that, as the 
record likewise suggests, avoiding the surgery entirely would have 
resulted in diminished hearing and lifelong ear infections, but no risk 
of death or serious incapacitation. Under these circumstances, 
suppose her physician strongly urges her to endure the surgery, with 
its attendant physical and psychological side effects, without 
presenting the alternative of no action as a feasible option. Suppose 
she undergoes the surgery, which is performed non-negligently, and 
recovers some hearing in the agreed-upon ear. We may, upon review 
of the preceding sections, understand that her unnecessary loss of 
autonomy, coupled with the physical trauma of surgery could—for 
someone deeply affected by such things—result in physical harm 
through the stress mechanisms triggered by a usurpation of her 
control over her world. In the regime proposed in this article, as 
emphasized in the last section, it would be crucial to prove that she 
in fact would have forgone the surgery before a cause of action for 
negligence would arise. But even if she could prove this, how much 
was she harmed by an otherwise non-negligent surgery that restored 
some degree of measurable health? We don’t know, after all, what 
her overall physical health would have been in the counterfactual 
world in which she did not endure the surgery. 
To answer the question of remedies I return again to the 
relationship between tort and criminal punishment. The distinction 
between private and public law remedies is as old as Blackstone’s 
Commentaries. Private law remedies restore something to the victim, 
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as opposed to criminal punishment, which provides a benefit to the 
public.187 Yet scholars of tort and remedies have long noted that this 
dichotomy is not absolute; as Anthony Sebok notes, “even legal 
novices learn quickly that the generalization has exceptions, either 
built directly into the law (such as punitive damages), or into its 
results (such as disgorgement).”188 If we consider that the “make-
whole” measure of compensatory damages may be wholly 
unadministrable in informed consent cases, it does not, therefore, 
follow that the wrong suffered by the hypothetical Mohr plaintiff 
cannot be compensated. I argue now that a focus on the respective 
personhoods of doctor and patient and the ways in which lack of 
consent improperly alters the relationship between the two parties 
provides us with a way of thinking about how the tort system can 
function, with some degree of precision, to correct this imbalance. 
Sebok’s two examples of the exceptions to the compensatory 
function of tort provide us with the most obvious candidates, and I 
will consider them in turn. 
1. Punitive damages 
Punitive damages allow juries to wield a large degree of 
discretion in increasing a tort victim’s damages based upon the 
mental attitude of the tortfeasor. The theoretical justifications for 
punitive damages—as exceptional as they appear against the generally 
compensatory justifications for tort law—are various. Commentators 
disagree as to the motivating principles behind punitive damages; 
they include everything from “punishment” and “deterrence” to 
education, retribution, compensation, and law enforcement.189 
Significantly, it has been noted that one appropriate role of punitive 
damages may be “compensating victims for otherwise 
uncompensable losses.”190 
At first blush, punitive damages appear an attractive means of 
compensating for a patient’s bodily interference. Pendent punitive 
damages in trespass may be supported by nominal actual damages, 
 
 187. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *7. 
 188. Anthony J. Sebok, What Does it Mean to Say that a Remedy Punishes?, 78 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 3, 4 (2003). 
 189. David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform, 39 
VILL. L. REV. 363, 365–66, 373–74 (1994). 
 190. See, e.g., Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 
56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1982). 
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and cases of informed consent—particularly once we understand the 
substantial, yet amorphous, physical consequences they may 
implicate—present an obvious parallel (this parallel, no doubt, 
resulted in the earlier battery conception of informed consent). In 
both cases, the defendant has violated some crucial aspect of the 
defendant’s personhood in a way that transcends a showing of actual 
loss. The “education” function of punitive damages would take the 
form, in these cases, of statements about the sanctity of personhood 
made by legal protections. If a physician interferes with a 
complicated relationship between a patient’s self and body in 
performing non-consensual procedures, the expression of this 
violated relationship through tort remedy is an appealing result. 
In their application of Jean Hampton’s analysis of retributivism 
in the criminal context to the case of punitive damages, Marc 
Galanter and David Luban note that in both cases “the wrongdoer 
has implicitly asserted a kind of undeserved mastery and superiority 
over the victim” and “[t]he purpose of punishment is to reassert the 
truth about the relative value of wrongdoer and victim by inflicting a 
publicly visible defeat on the wrongdoer.”191 Structurally, this 
suggests the appropriateness of punitive damages as a remedy for 
cases of inadequate informed consent. After all, the very nature of 
the problem is a physician’s improper assertion of mastery over his 
patient by deciding that his judgment was more important than 
the patient’s. 
Furthermore, punitive damages have a long history of utility in 
cases where the most significant harm can be classed as in some way 
psychological.192 Indeed, in Cooper Industries v. Leatherman Tool 
Group, the Supreme Court, articulating a more robust standard of 
review for Due Process challenges to punitive damages awards, relied 
upon a changed historical understanding of the function of punitive 
damages, one that moved from compensation for intangible injuries 
to the exercise of moral judgment about a defendant’s behavior.193 
Yet scholars have disagreed as to whether the Court correctly 
 
 191. Galanter & Luban, supra note 3, at 1432; see also Ellis, supra note 190, at 14–15 
(noting that “[t]he reported cases from roughly the first quarter of the seventeenth century 
through the first quarter of the nineteenth century” involving large damage awards unrelated 
to tangible loss “all involved acts that resulted in affronts to the honor of the victims”). 
 192. See Sebok, supra note 3, at 197–204 (2003) (surveying the nineteenth-century 
authority for imposing punitive damages in cases of emotional suffering and insult). 
 193. 532 U.S. 424 (2001). 
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understood the historical tradition of punitive damages as serving 
this sort of compensatory function, and, in any case, it is clear that 
today punitive damages are frequently awarded based upon a jury’s 
determination of the defendant’s improper state of mind. For 
example, the tort of intentionally inflicted emotional distress (IIED) 
is actionable where the defendant intentionally or recklessly causes 
severe emotional distress by extreme and outrageous conduct.194 
IIED does not require a showing of an underlying physical injury, 
and punitive damages are supported by the defendant’s intentionality 
in his actions.195 
For several reasons, then, punitive damages may be an overly 
blunt cudgel with which to compensate victims of overreaching 
physicians. In the first place, particularly when considered in the 
context of a physician’s legally and ethically imposed duty of 
beneficence, it is difficult to characterize the failure of informed 
consent as the sort of moral misconduct underlying torts such as 
IIED. To return to Hampton’s retributive framework for a moment, 
while both a criminal’s over-valuation of his own interests over that 
of his victim and a physician’s over-valuation of his own judgment 
over that of his patient result in the sort of affront to personhood 
punitive damages may serve to redress, the major distinction between 
those cases should be apparent. In many, if not most, cases of failed 
informed consent, a physician’s inappropriate substitution of 
judgment is at least done with the intention of benefitting the 
patient. There are doubtless extreme cases in which that is not true—
for example, the ordering of an unnecessary surgery in order to 
advance the physician’s own research—and in these cases punitive 
damages might well be appropriate, regardless of the outcome or 
competence of the procedure.196 But the basic case—a well-
 
 194. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965). 
 195. See id. 
 196. In the famous case of the incendiary Ford Pinto, for example, the jury awarded $125 
million in punitive damages to a boy who had been badly burned after the Pinto he was riding 
in exploded; the jury gave this award after learning that Ford had relied on a study that showed 
the costs of recalling the Pinto would outweigh the benefits (estimated at $200,000 per burn 
death avoided and $67,000 per injury avoided) by $100 million. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor 
Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 370 (Ct. App. 1981). As Galanter and Luban put it, it is not simply 
that Ford had displayed contempt for the plaintiff’s value, but it had displayed “a certain kind 
of contempt,” as though he possessed “merely a price, not a dignity.” Galanter & Luban, 
supra note 3, at 1436. A doctor who, through the provision of inadequate information, 
utilized his patient’s body as an object for the advancement of his own skills or research 
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intentioned infliction of harm through failure to take a patient’s 
decision-making into account—does not rise to the level that would 
justify an automatic award of punitive damages. To recognize that a 
harm has been inflicted which warrants compensation is not enough, 
in and of itself, to justify the particularly heightened “expressive 
defeat” implicit in punitive damages. Indeed, the inability to 
distinguish between these cases would severely compromise the 
ability of the tort system to perform an expressive function in this 
context at all. 
In the second place, allowing punitive damages for all cases of 
inadequate informed consent potentially opens the door to even 
greater imprecision in calculating awards than would some attempt 
at determining appropriate loss compensation. We generally utilize 
punitive damages to force potential tortfeasors to refrain from 
conduct which, like keeping the Ford Pinto on the market, is 
economically justified. In the case of medical malpractice, the 
potential tortfeasor is by definition an individual, as opposed to an 
organization, with a stake in his professional reputation, which 
would be jeopardized by any sort of finding of negligence in his 
process for obtaining informed consent. To improve upon the 
current situation does not, therefore, require default recourse to 
punitive damages, simply the creation of some sort of outlet for 
redress. Furthermore, some scholars have noted that juries may not 
be particularly good at following instructions about punitive 
damages, and if this is the case, the potential for excessive awards 
poses significant problems of overdeterrence.197 Therefore, even if 
one operates from a wrongs-based theory of tort and finds a place in 
this context for a punitive remedy for an otherwise uncompensable 
harm, the availability of punitive damages in these cases jeopardizes 
both retributive (“desert” based) and utilitarian goals. 
 
priorities would be guilty of exactly such a contempt for dignity, and would be deserving of the 
expressive condemnation implicit in punitive damages. 
 197. For evidence that juries may not be particularly good at following instructions about 
punitive damages, see, e.g., Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can’t Do Well: The 
Jury’s Performance as a Risk Manager, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 901 (1998); David Schkade et al., 
Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1139 (2000); W. Kip 
Viscusi, The Challenge of Punitive Damages Mathematics, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 313 (2001). But 
see Neil Vidmar, Juries Don’t Make Legal Decisions! And Other Problems: A Critique of Hastie et 
al. on Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 705, 711 (1999); Theodore Eisenberg & 
Martin T. Wells, Punitive Awards After BMW, a New Capping System, and the Reported 
Opinion Bias, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 387; Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages: Should Juries 
Decide?, 82 TEX. L. REV. 381 (2003) (book review). 
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2. Disgorgement 
Yet the appropriateness of punitive remedies in informed consent 
cases does not depend upon the availability of punitive damages. 
Remember that at the heart of the harm I have attempted to 
articulate in this article is the power relationship between doctor and 
patient and the physical effects of the expressive imbalances created by 
asymmetrical knowledge. This harm may be best vindicated by a 
remedy that takes this relationship into account; one that, as Sebok 
notes, is punitive not in form but in result: disgorgement. It should 
be remembered that a doctor and patient are neither unrelated 
parties (such as a property owner and theoretical trespasser) nor yet 
is the doctor a purely selfless purveyor of healing. In reality, they are 
parties to a contractual relationship, in which both stand to profit: 
the patient through healing and the doctor through compensation. 
The fact that in most cases an insurance company mediates the 
physician’s compensation should not obscure the fact that the doctor 
is being paid to provide a client with a service in precisely the same 
manner as an attorney is paid. 
Remedies theorists have noted a distinction between “property-
like” rights and so-called “rights against interference.”198 In general, 
a plaintiff can recover restitutionary damages where the defendant 
appropriates his property, violates his intellectual property, or puts 
his name or image to a commercial use.199 By contrast, victims of 
battery, negligence, nuisance, or defamation cannot recover these 
damages in most cases, even where the defendant has profited.200 
Ernest Weinrib has argued that, within a corrective justice 
framework, restitutionary damages such as disgorgement “ought to 
be available only insofar as they correspond to a constituent element 
in the wrong that the defendant has done to the plaintiff.”201 For 
Weinrib, disgorgement should be available in cases of property-type 
torts because included within the concept of property itself is “the 
proprietor’s entitlement [to] the potential gains from the property’s 
use or alienation.”202 By contrast, disgorgement should not be 
 
 198. See, e.g., James Gordley, The Purpose of Awarding Restitutionary Damages: A Reply 
to Professor Weinrib, 1 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 39, 42 (2000). 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Ernest J. Weinrib, Restitutionary Damages as Corrective Justice, 1 THEORETICAL 
INQ. L.1, 7(2000). 
 202. Id. 
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available in other contexts solely to promote punitive or deterrent 
goals because those cases cannot account for why the plaintiff, in 
particular, should be entitled to reap the defendant’s gain, and 
therefore plaintiffs in such cases should be limited to actual harm.203 
However, the mere distinction between property-like rights and 
the right to be free from interference by others is necessarily hazy.204 
Indeed, “[r]ecognition of the rights against interference is necessary 
to constitute a property right and to make it valuable.”205 
Conversely, Radin’s theory of property as personhood certainly 
demonstrates the ways in which the concept of property grows out 
of the concept of the self.206 A physician who benefits from his 
interference with a patient’s physical person has inflicted a harm, and 
where this harm has translated into enrichment, it strains logic to 
imagine that the patient is not the proper party to recover the value 
of that enrichment simply because his property in his self would not 
have profited him by the same economic metric through which the 
physician profited. 
Furthermore, disgorgement is available in legal contexts beyond 
the unjust enrichment from simple appropriation of another’s 
property. It is a foundational premise, for example, in the law of 
fiduciaries. A fiduciary who wrongfully gains through the use of his 
position must disgorge that gain to his beneficiary even if the 
beneficiary has suffered no loss.207 A fiduciary is liable in such cases 
because a person should not profit from his own wrong, because 
requiring disgorgement gives effect to the beneficiary’s implicit 
expectations, and because disgorgement shapes the conduct of 
fiduciaries to reflect the reasonable expectations of beneficiaries.208 
The relationship between a doctor and patient bears a striking 
structural resemblance to that between a principal and an agent in a 
fiduciary relationship. When a patient submits to a medical 
procedure, he temporarily cedes control of his property in himself to 
his physician. This separation of ownership and control provides the 
opportunity for the physician to appropriate some of the value of the 
 
 203. Id. at 36–37. 
 204. Gordley, supra note 198, at 44. 
 205. Id. 
 206.  See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 207. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.02 cmts. d, e (2006). 
 208. Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic 
Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1049–56 (1991). 
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patient’s body—not measured, of course, in the dollar value 
applicable in most fiduciary contexts, but through the transformation 
of the patient’s subjective valuation of his body (his desire, for 
example, to preserve it from surgery) into objective financial gain for 
the physician. Like the agent who may be unable, in the face of 
unanticipated contingencies, to promise particular results and whose 
duty is therefore legally limited to a broad requirement of “good 
faith,” a physician cannot anticipate all potential complications from 
a particular course of treatment and is therefore bound by broad 
standards of care and duties such as “doing no harm.” And, like the 
principal who may be prevented from direct monitoring of his agent 
through prohibitive costs or lack of expert knowledge, a patient—as 
discussed in Part III of this article—lacks the knowledge to 
adequately monitor his physician’s translation of knowledge. 
The similarity of the doctor-patient relationship to that of 
fiduciaries therefore illustrates the appropriateness of disgorgement 
as a remedy for the performance of a medical procedure without 
providing enough information to obtain informed consent. A patient 
who has consented to a procedure they would otherwise have 
forgone with adequate information has suffered a physical harm, and 
that harm has translated into profit for the physician who imposed it. 
Understanding the nature of the wrong theoretically encompassed 
by the doctrine of informed consent allows us to see how it is an 
interference with personhood through the usurpation of a patient’s 
subjective strategies for coping with illness and healing. The very loss 
of control occasioned by illness is a compromise of personhood 
exacerbated by a doctor’s unwanted intervention. Because the 
remedy of disgorgement captures and reifies this relational dynamic, 
it is the appropriate instrument through which the tort system can 
recognize the unique wrong such a dynamic may create. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This article began with the observation that tort law has been 
plagued by a kind of schizophrenia as to the sorts of harms it 
recognizes as the basis for recovery, and the purposes—expressive or 
compensatory—for which such recovery exists. I have also 
endeavored to show how individual victims’ subjective experiences of 
their harms may, under certain circumstances, become constitutive of 
those harms themselves, and that our definition of legal wrong 
should thus account for them. Fully understanding this phenomenon 
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is a first step toward resolving the dichotomies that have troubled the 
field. Taking the example of criminal law, I argued that, due to the 
role of individual victims’ subjective experiences in forming the 
collective experience of crime, such narratives should enter the penal 
system at the punishment phase as part of the public wrong being 
redressed. Because the tort system has a parallel expressive 
function—which it exercises through the definition of private 
wrongs—it should also, to the extent consistent with the rule of law, 
attend to the role of victim narrative in defining harm. In both of 
these contexts the protection of personhood depends in part on 
understanding the relationship between “physical” harm and the 
mental experience thereof, and our legal account of personhood 
would be more legitimate if it expressed this understanding. 
I have focused in particular on the tort arising from a physician’s 
failure to provide enough information to obtain adequate informed 
consent because it occupies a strange and enlightening space in the 
tort field. With historical underpinnings in battery and a 
contemporary negligence standard that, when unpacked, imports a 
loss-allocative standard of duty into a space where it cannot function 
coherently, the law should define this tort with a more robust 
understanding of the nature of the wrong it theoretically redresses. 
But the relationship between personhood, narrative, and legal harm 
has application well beyond this example, in both the criminal law 
and tort contexts.209 The ideas presented in this article are intended 
 
 209. In the debate, for example, about the controversial status of hate crimes, a common 
argument against their constitutionality criticizes the expressive element of the criminal 
misconduct as violating the First Amendment. See generally Craig Peyton Gaumer, Punishment 
for Prejudice: A Commentary on the Constitutionality and Utility of State Statutory Responses to 
the Problem of Hate Crimes, 39 S.D. L. REV. 1 (1994) (critiquing hate crime statutes as 
“statutes designed to punish racist, sexist, and other bigoted beliefs”). Defenders of such 
statutes point to the additional psychological harms imposed on victims of hate crimes as 
constituting an additional element susceptible of punishment. See generally Lu-in Wang, The 
Transforming Power of “Hate”: Social Cognition Theory and the Harms of Bias-Related Crime, 
71 S. CAL. L. REV. 47 (1997) (“[T]he asserted justification for penalty enhancement is that 
crimes motivated by group-based bias impose greater harms than their parallel crimes, and that 
the state’s desire to redress these special harms provided the basis for the Supreme Court’s 
finding that penalty enhancement is constitutionally permissible and does not merely punish 
offensive thought in violation of the First Amendment.”) (footnote omitted). A more robust 
understanding of the relationship between the disruption of self-narrative and physical harm 
would provide a more solid basis for legitimating these statutes. Furthermore, if we understand 
the Second Amendment as protecting expressive aspects of personhood, we should see how 
both the personhood of the offender in such cases (through speech) and that of the victim 
(through association) are implicated in cases of hate crimes, and that a proper understanding of 
the Second Amendment must negotiate between the two. 
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to encourage such conversations, which will be enriched with 
continued dialogue between the fields of law, psychology, 
and narratology. 
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